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All useCenter-periphery explanations focus on political centralization, state
collapse, and nationalization to explain the genesis of separatist move-
ments that form new national states. This study shows that three pe-
riods of Chinese-Mongolian relations—land reform (1900–1911), revo-
lutionandinterregnum(1912–16)andwarlordism(1917–30)—contained
events that center-periphery perspectives associate with the rise of au-
tonomous movements, yet Mongolian separatism did not occur until
the last period. To explain this puzzle, the author characterizes the
formation, integration, anddismemberment of the frontier governance
system as an intermediate body between the center and the periphery.
She demonstrates that the effects pointed to by center-periphery ex-
planationsweremediated, at least in the case of InnerMongolia, by the
structural transformations of the frontier governance system. Not as-
suming a natural opposition between the center and the periphery, this
study elucidates the polarization of the center-periphery relationship
and its impact on minority separatism.This article explains the timing of Mongolian separatism within the context
of Chinese imperial dissolution in the early 20th century. Mongols were the
most powerful and important minority allies of the Qing Empire (1644–author wishes to thank Julia Adams, Sida Liu, Peter Perdue, GengTian, Xiaohong
ick Wilson, and Dingxin Zhao for their helpful comments on early drafts of this
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Al1912). Their political status was severely jeopardized by the late Qing land
reform launched around 1905, as well as by the substitution ofManchu (the
ruling minority of the Qing Empire) rule by a Han Chinese republic after
the 1911 revolution. In center-periphery explanations, political centraliza-
tion, state collapse, and nationalization are key events that trigger minority
separatism in imperial settings. Yet none of these events directly triggered
Mongolian separatism. Instead, Mongolian separatism emerged almost one
decade after the dissolution of the Qing Empire, at a moment when Chinese
provincial warlordism prevailed. In this article, I attempt to explain why.
In terms of the scale of territory, ethnic diversity, and imperial organi-
zation, the Qing Empire resembled the Ottoman and Tsarist Russian Em-
pires to a high degree. After encountering western modernization in the
19th century, all three empires underwent dramatic transformations, and, to
various degrees, all were haunted by the peril of imperial dissolution. After
all, imperial crisis was often precipitated byminorities’ various endeavors to
readjust their positions in the imperial structure, coalescing into a ﬁssuring
force that broke apart the empires. Among these three empires, the politi-
cization of minority identity occurred latest in China, with Mongols being
the ﬁrst minority group to expressly articulate ethnic separatism. I contend
that the belated emergence of minority separatism in China can be success-
fully explained only by taking into account China’s unique structure of fron-
tier governance.
The frontier governance system examined in this article designates an in-
termediate body of governance that linked the frontier to the imperial court
and bridged interaction between Mongols and Han Chinese. It was not a
pure agent of the imperial center, even though it greatly facilitated central
state expansion onmany occasions. Neither did it naturally merge with any
particular indigenous ethnic groups, even though their collaborations were
frequent. In Inner Mongolia, the frontier governance system was a multi-
ethnic organization, incorporatingManchumilitary governorswho ledMan-
chu garrisons, Mongolian banner nobles who were the hereditary leaders of
the basicMongolian units (the banners), andHanChinesemigrant elites who
administratively responded to the commands of neighboring Han Chinese
provincial governors. The frontier governance system mediated interactions
between center and periphery, Han and Mongols, while simultaneously for-
tifying its own autonomy. The transformations of its structure—from a rel-
atively loose assemblage of multiethnic actors to a highly integrated broker-
age system—and its ﬁnal dismemberment help us better understand the
mysterious timing of Mongolian separatism in China.AJS reviewers for their feedback, which made a signiﬁcant improvement possible. The
author is of course responsible for any errors. Direct correspondence to Liping Wang,
Social Sciences Collegiate Division, University of Chicago, 5845 South Ellis Avenue,
Chicago, Illinois 60637. E-mail: lipingw@uchicago.edu
1642
This content downloaded from 147.008.230.123 on August 23, 2016 19:30:56 PM
l use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
From Masterly Brokers to Compliant ProtégéesTheoretically, my study discusses the merits and limitations of center-
periphery explanations that underlie the majority of scholarship on empire-
to-nation transition. These explanations view a set of events (including
political centralization, nationalization, and state collapse) as the cause of
minority nationalism within the imperial context. By envisioning the periph-
ery as either safely secluded from the imperial center via a mode of indi-
rect rule or directly controlled by the center in transition toward direct rule,
these explanations offer a parsimonious, yet crude, model of imperial orga-
nization. My study pinpoints the existence of the frontier governance system
as an intermediate body of governance that leads to the rejection of a sim-
pliﬁed categorization of direct or indirect rule. A characterization of the na-
ture and transformation of the frontier governance system enables us to spec-
ify under what conditions political centralization, nationalization, and state
collapse reinforce or dilute ethnic tensions and when they lead to separatist
movements. My study therefore will enrich discussions of center-periphery
relationship by adding qualiﬁcations.
The article is organized into ﬁve parts. The ﬁrst part outlines center-
periphery explanations, their insights on the organization, operation, and
dissolution of empires, and my alternative approach to these questions.
The second part introduces the historical background of the China–Inner
Mongolia case and the primary data used to supportmy argument. The next
three parts analyze the transformations of the frontier governance system,
with a special focus on the change in recruitment and role of the frontier
military governors. In conclusion, I brieﬂy discuss the implications of this
study for more general comparative research on empires and nationalism.EMPIRE, THE CENTER-PERIPHERY MODEL,
AND MINORITY NATIONALISM
The dissolution of empires is often considered a consequence of minority
ethnic mobilizations. These mobilizations can be oriented toward nation-
alism if they call for “making the boundary of the nation coterminous with
that of the state” (Hechter 2000, p. 7). In such cases, mobilizations involve
secessionist movements toward establishing independent sovereign states.
They can also involve struggles for speciﬁc ethnic rights, while not osten-
sibly seeking political independence. The causal connections between mi-
nority ethnic mobilizations and imperial dissolution are illustrated bymany
studies.2 Despite disparate historical narratives, many of these studies focus2For minority separatism in Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union, see Suny (1993),
Brubaker (1994), Beissinger (2002), Martin (2001), and Hirsch (2005). For the Ottoman
case, see Davison (1977), Haddad (1977), Breuilly (1982), Keyder (1997), Wimmer (2002),
Barkey (2006, 2008). For ethnicity and European colonialism, see Young (1965), Mam-
dani (1996), Cooper (1997), Posner (2005).
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Alon a center-periphery relationship. The dynamic interactions between the
imperial center and the periphery are often conceived as determined by a set
of key events—that is, political centralization, state collapse, and national-
ization—which in effect increase or decrease the attachment of the periph-
eral minorities. That consequently leads to the maintenance or dissolution
of the empire.Center-Periphery Explanations
Center-periphery explanations, in various versions, underscore the notion
that an empire is structurally and functionally distinct from a nation-state.
Most empire studies endorse such a view. Being wary of the shortcomings
of the nation-state framework (Go 2009; Adams and Steinmetz 2015), many
contemporary scholars tend to emphasize two correlated aspects of empire:
its decentralized structure and its capacity to contain ethnic conﬂicts.3
The decentralized structure makes empire characteristically an assem-
blage of territories whose populations rarely intermingle and whose com-
munication with the center is poor. Retaining the ultimate symbolic au-
thority in the center, most empires allow indigenous political leaders to run
their own affairs (Tilly 1997; Hechter 2000, p. 27). Using the example of the
18th-century Ottoman Empire, Karen Barkey (1994) shows that political
decentralization was more a sign of strength than weakness in the empire,
as it allowed the imperial rulers to fully adapt to local needs.4
Scholars of colonialism use another term, “indirect rule,” to indicate the
decentralized structure of empires. Indirect rule was a British innovation
of the 19th century designed to solve the problems brought about by the
expansion of colonialism that challenged earlier forms of rule that featured
civilizing missions and cultural assimilation.5 The quintessential tenet of
“indirect rule,” as illustrated by Lord Lugard (1965), is that by coopting lo-3Some scholars dispute the dichotomy between empire and nation-state. For example,
KrishanKumar (2010, pp. 124–28) argues that the often idealizedEuropean nation-states
were not internally uniﬁed, thus making them undistinguishable from the old empires.
Also see David Armitage’s (2000) discussion of the composite monarchies and Robert
Bartlett’s (1993) work on the internal conquests within Europe.
4Barkey (1994) and a few others (such as Salzmann 1993) argue that the empowerment
of local militia and the privatization of the state administration do not imply the “decline”
of the Ottoman Empire in this period. Rather, from 1695 to 1793, decentralization gen-
erated large, diffuse, but interrelated loci of state power, which helped convey state au-
thority into local dominions, thus “laying the social foundation for the centralizing polities
instituted from 1812 on.”
5According to Frederick Cooper (1997, p. 410), early colonial regimes at times took the
reformist agenda seriously. By the 1920s, however, both Great Britain and France grad-
ually displaced their civilizing missions with nominal “indirect rule” in order to preserve
“customary” tribal authority.
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From Masterly Brokers to Compliant Protégéescal rulers into the system of imperial authority, the empire could be ruled
cheaply and conveniently (Mamdani 1996).
Following these discussions, many scholars attempt, by focusing on the
center-periphery relationship, to explain how empires could successfully con-
tain nationalism.MichaelHechter’swork offers a good example.He suggests
that indirect rule designates a decentralized structure in which authority is
divided between a center and the constituted lower-level units (e.g., prov-
inces, states, regions, and localities; Hechter 2000, p. 27). These lower-level
units are likely to be culturally heterogeneous, and it is important to realize
that they tend to be homogeneous within their boundaries (Hechter 2000,
p. 43). Such a structure allows local authorities, coming from multiethnic
backgrounds, to evade arbitrary interventions and coercions from the cen-
ter and thus be responsible for their own governance. The lack of interlocal
communications further increases the costs of any horizontal mobilizations.
This structure consequently reduces the chances of contact between differ-
ent ethnic populations (Hechter et al. 2006). It also reduces the possibility of
group comparison, a key mechanism leading to ethnic conﬂict (Horowitz
1985, p. 165).
Yet, despite the advantages of indirect rule, it could not eliminate im-
perial crises elicited by some dramatic events that threatened to break apart
the center-periphery relationship. In fact, the relatively autonomous local
governance provided organizational resources for peripheral separatistmove-
ments. A decaying central state losing the capacity tomaintain social control
(Tilly 1997; Hechter 2000, pp. 33–34) often generated opportunities for pe-
ripheral separatism, which was launched to readdress grievances and re-
adjust the distribution of group interests (Davison 1977; Khalidi 1977; Had-
dad 1977; Campbell 2007). Exogenous shocks such asworldwar or domestic
liberal reforms could also be catalytic events to tip the center-periphery
balance. For example, Ellen Comisso (2006) elucidates how World War I
procured opportunities for minority separatism in the Habsburg and Otto-
man empires, a situation exacerbated by the intervention of the Great Pow-
ers. In a different light, Mark Beissinger (2002) depicts how a swift liberal
turn in the former Soviet Union engendered a series of “contentious events”
that unfolded between the all-union government and the contending mi-
nority leaders, facilitating the reconﬁguration of minority identities in ways
that demanded political separation.
Among the dramatic events compelling minority separatism, the most
important one is the shift of empire from indirect to direct rule (Doyle 1986;
Hechter 2000; Wimmer 2002; Barkey 2008), often embodied in the form of
state nationalism (Anderson 1983, chap. 6). Direct rule increased state pen-
etration at the expense of local political autonomy. By imposing the domi-
nant culture on local minorities, it also severely affected the cultural auton-
omy of the indigenous people. As a result, minority separatism occurred.1645
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AlThese studies elucidate the evolving dynamics between the center and
the periphery. They show that empire was vulnerable in the face of some
dramatic events, including political centralization, nationalization, state
collapse, and the intervention of foreign powers, which strained the center-
periphery relationship. These events are often claimed as the causes of mi-
nority separatism. Historical literature on minority separatism in the Otto-
man and Russian Empires attest to such an explanation.Minority Separatism in the Ottoman and Russian Empires
The demise of the Ottoman Empire is conventionally considered to be an
outcome of burgeoning minority separatism within its multiple peripheries
beginning in the 19th century. Among the multiple frontiers, the Hellenist-
Balkan region receives the most attention and provides much of our knowl-
edge about ethnic problems in the Ottoman Empire.6 The intensive nation
building embarked upon by the Ottoman Empire starting in the mid-19th
century is thought to have adversely strained the relationship between the
central state and local minority groups, resulting in the centrifugal move-
ments that eventually shattered the empire.
TheOttoman rulers conqueredwest Anatolia, Bulgaria, northernGreece,
Bosnia, and Serbia and secured the subordination of the Christian princes
in southwest Europe around the 13th and 14th centuries (Shaw 1976–77, p. 12).
Their eastern march, concluded in the 16th century, was accomplished by
war with the Safavids, the conquest of eastern Anatolia, and the eventual
subjugation of the Arab world. Yet, from the mid-17th through the 18th
centuries, Ottoman rule became increasingly decentralized, especially in
the Balkan region. The impetus behind such a change, as Barkey (2008,
p. 241) suggests, was the ﬂourishing of international trade, which turned
the Balkans into a commercial center where both Christian and Jewish
merchants established extensive business kinship networks through their
family members in European cities. When the sultan instituted the Tan-
zimat reform in themid-19th century in order to recentralize state control in its
various domains, resistance movements toward autonomy—often clothed
in ethnic/national slogans—quickly erupted and engulfed the whole Balkan
region.
Although scholars use different names to describe the traditional decen-
tralized Ottoman rule (e.g., indirect rule, Hechter [2000]; mosaic structure,
Wimmer [2002]; brokerage system, Barkey [2008]), they all agree that po-
litical decentralization preempted peripheral separatism in Ottoman his-
tory. The Tanzimat reform—intended to empower the state in confronta-6For how minorities in the “western frontier” ﬁrst initiated nationalist movements to
challenge the control of the Ottoman imperial center, see Davison (1977), Haddad
(1977), Breuilly (1982), Keyder (1997), Barkey (2008).
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From Masterly Brokers to Compliant Protégéestions with the European powers—signiﬁed the transition of the empire to a
nation-state. By introducing parliamentary institutions and education re-
forms, the central state endangered the status quo of peripheral minority
elites and their cultural autonomy (Wimmer 2002, p. 166). These events
aroused peripheral separatism.
The demise of the Tsarist Russian Empire provides another case, one
where minority separatism merged with a proletarian social revolution to
generate violent and sweeping repercussions permeating and reaching be-
yond the Russian Empire (Lenin [1914] 1995; Slezkine 1994; Von Hagen
1997; Martin 2001, chap. 2; Riga 2008). The Tsarist reform initiated after
1905 tightened state control in many realms. Short of upward mobility, the
middle and upper-middle classes of various minority groups (in particular
the Jews, Poles, Germans, and other advanced minorities) feared the in-
trusion of the Russian state as much as did the Russian proletariat, whose
lives were impoverished by aggressive state taxation.7 As with the Otto-
manEmpire, theRussian turn toward intensivenation-state buildingdeeply
aggravated the peripheral minorities. Quite differently, the minorities’ dis-
content was further incited by the Russian Bolsheviks, who understood the
power of an all-encompassing revolution that merged ethnic and proletar-
ian revolutions.
Although the Russian story ﬁts quite well with the center-periphery
model, it should be noted that the Romanov Russian Empire was for cen-
turies a polyglot and polyreligious state, which cleaved along both religious
and nonethnic differences, instead of being compartmentalized into clearly
deﬁned national units (Brubaker 1994, n. 12). The conﬁguration of center-
periphery relationship best matches the case of the Soviet Union rather than
that of the Russian Empire. A nestedmodel of center-periphery interactions
is used by Brubaker (1994) to explain the rise of minority separatism in the
Soviet Union.
Embodying the principle of ethnoterritorial federalism, the Soviet Union
was constructed as a set of national-territorial administrative units—the
national republics—“to harness, contain, channel, and control the poten-
tially disruptive political expression of nationality” (Brubaker 1994, p. 49).
To substantiate the political boundary of national republics, the Soviet lead-
ers produced rigid codiﬁcations of personal nationality, cultivated national
languages, cadres, and intelligentsias and pursued deliberate, afﬁrmative
nation building. The central state coordinated the organization of these tit-
ular national units, each of which represented an ethnic periphery.8 When7For the common fate of the minority elite and the Russian proletariat, see Riga (2008,
2012).
8Hardening the national/ethnic boundary and making it coterminous with the territorial-
administrative boundary of each republic is an innovation created by the collective ef-
forts of Soviet politicians and ethnographers; see Suny (1993), Martin (2001).
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AlSoviet liberal reform, initiated in the late 1980s, slackened central state con-
trol and unbalanced jurisdictional struggles between the center and the
periphery, the ﬁrst layer of the center-periphery relationship dissolved. Sub-
sequently an enormous wave of peripheral separatism exploded.9
More than that, Brubaker sagaciously points out that within each titular
nation, a second layer of center-periphery relationships also deteriorated.
Each national republic was founded in accordance with the law of ethno-
territorial federalism. Smaller communities of subminorities were endowed
with cultural autonomy by the central government. These marginal ethno-
cultural communities contested the hegemony of titular nations and aggra-
vated tensions between them following the independence of those nations.
In other words, the Soviet Union was split by two levels of spreading
center-periphery conﬂicts: one unfolding between the central government
and national republics, the other between the titular nations and marginal
cultural minorities. The nested model complicates the baseline model of the
center-periphery relationship, as it acknowledges that the peripherywas not
homogeneous, but was fractured by plural ethnic groups. In the Soviet case,
the sudden relaxation of central state control, not political centralization,
became a catalyst of minority separatism. Despite these major differences,
the nested model is still focused on the events that strained the interactions
between a presumably bounded center and a bounded periphery.
To brieﬂy summarize, all these studies concentrate on the center-periphery
relationship to illustrate the correlation between the eruption of minority
nationalism and imperial downfall. They assume that empire is composed
of an imperial center withmultiple peripheries and that the latter are at best
only loosely coupled with the former, in accordance to the rule of decen-
tralization. As a result, the peripheral political elites enjoy high autonomy,
because the decentralized political structure reduces the central impact,
as well as the contact, among ethnically different subjects in the imperial
realm. Owing to this structure, many empires have successfully contained
peripheral centrifugal movements.
Events leading to peripheral separatism vary. There can be a sudden
collapse of the imperial center, due to the devastation of a violent revolution.
There can also be a formation of independent nonstate economic ties that
facilitates the horizontal connections among the peripheral peoples. This
can be seen in the case of theOttoman-Balkan region. A sudden softening of9Motyl (2001) similarly emphasizes that the disintegration of the USSR starts from the
dysfunctional bureaucracy in the center, which compelled peripheral autonomy. Beis-
singer (2002, pp. 26–27) also argues that the political environment caused by “loosened
state authority” after the liberal reform provided an opportunity structure for the mo-
bilization of peripheral separatism. Seeing the inability of the center to launch repressive
countermeasures, peripheral minorities grasped this opportunity to challenge the Soviet
identity laid down by the center.
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From Masterly Brokers to Compliant Protégéesstate authority, as in the case of the Soviet Union, can be another catalyst for
peripheral separation. Most important, the stimulus can be the shift from
indirect to direct rule, implemented to increase state power and empire-wide
cultural homogenization. These events all contribute to the rearrangement
of center-periphery relationship. If painstaking bargaining processes fail
to pacify both sides, this failure, too, triggers peripheral separatism move-
ments. This model has proven its strength in the cases of the Ottoman Em-
pire, the Soviet Union, and, partially, Tsarist Russia. Can it provide an
equally robust explanation to the causes and timing of peripheral separat-
ism in the China case?
The main focus in this study is on the Inner Mongolian frontier during
the late Qing Empire and the early Republic of China, circa the 1890s to
1930s. This period can be broken into three phases: land reform (1900–
1911), revolution (1912–16), and warlordism (1917–30). Both the ﬁrst and
third phase saw intensive political centralization, one implemented by the
Qing court and the other by the provincial warlords’ regimes. Mongolian
separatism did not erupt until the third phase rather than the ﬁrst one. The
second phase saw the collapse of the imperial center with simultaneous at-
tempts to sinicize frontier institutions. During that period, the Mongolian
frontier remained peaceful and did not see large-scale separatism. The be-
lated emergence ofMongolian separatismwithin the context of Chinese im-
perial dissolution suggests that we need to search for a new explanation.
This new explanation will recognize the unique structure of the Chinese
empire—characterized by the frontier governance system as an intermediate
body—that buffered center-periphery and Mongol-Han relationships in
China. Its rise and fall signiﬁcantly confounds the impact of state centraliza-
tion, revolution, state collapse, and nationalization. Clarifying the structural
transformations of this system will help us better understand when these
dramatic events have a causal effect on minority separatist movements.THE UNIQUE STRUCTURE OF THE CHINESE IMPERIAL SYSTEM
Inner Mongolia is a high, sunny, windy plateau that gradually slopes down
to the Gobi Desert separating Inner Mongolia from Mongolia proper. The
annual rainfall on the steppe is less than 14 inches, and its small rivers
ﬂowing north into the Gobi soon disappear in the sand and grass. Irriga-
tion in this land is not practical, which makes it ideal for herding (Atwood
2002, pp. 56–59). Mongols, or more broadly the nomads, their advance or
retreat, their growth or decline, decisively inﬂuenced patterns of expansion
and contraction of the Chinese empire. This uncertainty of frontier bound-
ary gradually disappeared after the Manchu conquest in 1644; at that time
Inner Mongolia was stabilized as an internal frontier of China (Lattimore
1940; Perdue 2005).1649
This content downloaded from 147.008.230.123 on August 23, 2016 19:30:56 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
American Journal of Sociology
AlUnlike the principalities in the Balkan region or Eastern Europe, In-
ner Mongolia did not form any supralocal political center dominated by a
sovereign-like ruler. Rather, the mobile Mongols were scattered in small,
isolatedunitswhosepolitical association rarely exceeded the conﬁnesof clans
and tribes. Adapting to the indigenous segmentation of the Mongols, the
Qing Empire instituted a complex governance system to harness their mo-
bility while bestowing upon them a relative autonomy. These measures dis-
tinguished Mongols from the majority Han Chinese, who were subject to
regular bureaucratic control.
In the Qing Empire, the realm of Inner Mongolia was divided into four
eastern (Jerim, Josotu, Juu Uda, and Shili-yin Gool leagues) and two
western leagues (Ulaanchab and Yekhe Juu leagues).10 Its boundaries were
much smaller than the contemporary Inner Mongolian Autonomous Re-
gion under the People’s Republic of China, because it did not include the
northeastern section inhabited by theHulun Buir SolonEight Banners and
the New Bargu Eight Banners. Nor did it include the western part that
extends into Gansu and Ningxia provinces where the OriotMongols lived
(see ﬁg. 1).
In this large space, the Qing emperors heavily relied on the cooperation
among the Mongolian leagues and banners, the Manchu military gover-
nors, and the neighboring Han Chinese provinces. Figure 2 illustrates the
Inner Mongolian governance structure under the Qing.
Figure 2 shows that the basic unit of Mongolian governance is the ban-
ner/league institution. With the exception of the Eight Banners of Chakhar
and the Tümed Banners in Guihua town, which were governed by nonhe-
reditary ofﬁcials directly appointed by the emperor, most parts of Inner
Mongolia were divided into banners and leagues that recognized the lead-
ership of the jasag nobles. Each Mongol banner, khoshuu in Mongolian,
was a decimal organization that combined civilian and military functions.
It usually contained about 3,000–8,000 members in the high steppe and
15,000–25,000 people near China (Atwood 2002, p. 24).11 The banner was
divided into several sum (literally, “arrows”) and each sum or arrow was10The ChakharBanners, TümedBanners, and four special grazing lands (si muchang)—
Shangdu, Mingan, Zuoyi, and Youyi—scattered in this region were often called “Inter-
nal Mongolia” (neishu menggu) to distinguish them from “Inner Mongolia” (Tan 1935,
pp. 34–37). Although Justin Tighe translates the neishu menggu as “Court Mongolia,” I
literally translate it as “Internal Mongolia.” In Internal Mongolia, Mongols were not
ruled by hereditary jasag nobles but by imperial appointees. The autonomy of the in-
habitants of this region was more circumscribed than was the case for Inner Mongolia
(Tighe 2005, p. 39). A banner was the basic military and civilian organization of Mon-
gols under the Qing. On the banner institution, see a summary account by Brunnert et al.
(1911) or Aberle and Vreeland (1962).
11 In the decimal system, the Mongols were organized into units of tens, hundreds, and
thousands.
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FIG. 1.—Map: Inner Mongolia under the Qing, 1644–1911 (this map is made with the
assistance of Yi Wang).
From Masterly Brokers to Compliant Protégéesrequested to provide 150 adultmales capable ofmilitary service. In addition
to its military function, the banner was also “the hereditary domain of the
ruling lord who managed its subjects and territory with the assistance of a
series of ofﬁcials and held judicial authority over his subjects” (Boldbaatar
and Sneath 2006, p. 299). In other words, the banner leaders were also in
charge of the civil and judicial administration of the Mongols.FIG. 2.—Inner Mongolian Governance Structure under the Qing, 1644–1900
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AlTo counter the free mobility of the Mongols, lest a powerful leader like
Genghis Khan arise, the Manchu emperors ﬁxed the domains of the ban-
ners. Under the Qing, Inner Mongolia was divided into 49 banners. The
jasag, normally a descendent of the Borjigin family (the Golden lineage
descended from Genghis Khan), was selected from among and elected by
the banner nobles. Usually there existed six ranks of nobles within the
banner. Above the banner, Manchu rulers set up the league as a temporary
organization for the banner leaders to make decisions on important inter-
banner affairs.12
The banner-league institution allowed Mongol elites to manage their in-
ternal affairs autonomously. It appears to be the equivalent of indirect rule
in China. Yet its autonomy was constrained by other governing institu-
tions. First of all, banners were subordinate to Lifan yuan (the Court of
Dependencies), a central institution that managed frontier affairs and the
regular relationship with tributary states. They were also under the occa-
sional inspection of frontier military governors, who were dispatched to
maintain frontiermilitary security.13 Among the frontiermilitary governors,
the three roles most important in Inner Mongolia were Suiyuan jiangjun
(general), Chakhar dutong (commander-in-chief ), and Jehol dutong.14
The autonomy of Mongol banners was further restricted by the extended
oversight of the neighboringHanChinese provincial authorities. InnerMon-
golia geographically abutted the territory of several northern Chinese prov-
inces. Poor Han Chinese peasants, peddlers, fugitives, and disbanded sol-
diers often crossed the GreatWall and inﬁltrated the frontier. This migration
resulted in the penetration of the Chinese provincial administration. Con-
sequently, Chinese-style local governments, speciﬁcally the ting (subprefec-
tures), were established to govern the Han Chinese migrants residing in the
frontier region.1512For more details, see Su-de-bi-li-ge (2007, pp. 8–9). Su-de-bi-li-ge points out that not
all Mongols were organized into this banner-league system. The Internal Mongols were
not assigned the jasag as their leaders. Instead, the nonhereditary ofﬁcials Zongguan or
fu Zongguan directly governed them; these ofﬁcials could be removed at the discretion of
the Manchu emperor. Internal Mongols included those intimate to the Manchu court and
the rebellious ones, whowere carefully placed under direct control of theManchu court.
13For more details see Zhao (1993, pp. 338–40, 105–8) and Su-de-bi-li-ge (2007, pp. 6–7).
14Suiyuan jiangjun was appointed in 1737. He was supposed to be responsible for
military affairs related to two Tümed banners, theUlaanchab and Yekhe Juu leagues. In
1761, Chakhar dutong was appointed at Zhangjiakou, taking care of the eight Chakhar
banners and the four special grazing lands, as well as the military affairs in the Shili-
yin Gool league. In 1810, Jehol dutong was appointed, taking care of the Josotu and
JuuUda leagues.
15Ting (subprefecture) is a special unit of civil administration uncommon in the Chinese
inner land, but popular in the frontier. According to Skinner ([1977] 1995), “While
prefectures, departments and counties were most commonly found throughout China
Proper, the establishment of dependent and independent sub-prefectures was a favored
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From Masterly Brokers to Compliant ProtégéesTo summarize, under the Qing rule, InnerMongolia was governed bymul-
tiple institutions. The autonomy of theMongol banners was moderated byin-
terventions fromLifan yuan,Manchumilitary governors, and theneighboring
HanChineseprovincialgovernments.Formostof theQingdynasty, this gov-
ernance system was only loosely coupled. Its integration was signiﬁcantly
improved only after land reformpracticeswere inaugurated in the early 20th
century. This governance system uniquely characterized theChinese empire
and complicates the mechanisms and effects of center-periphery dynamics.
To portray the structural transformations of the frontier governance
system, I will focus on both institutional changes and the reconstruction of
leadership. I use both primary and secondary sources. In this article, the
archival sources of the Department of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs are
applied in English-language scholarship for the ﬁrst time. The correspon-
dence among the frontier military governors, Han Chinese migrant elites,
the central government, and the neighboring Chinese provinces manifests
their complex interactions.
My second contribution is a compilation of the biographies of major
frontiermilitary governors. These data show the refashioning of the frontier
collective leadership over four decades. While compiling the biographical
data, Imostly referred toQing shi lie zhuan ½Biographies related to theQing
history (Guoshiguan and Zhonghua shu ju 1928),Minguo renwu da cidian
½Dictionary of the people during the Republic of China (Xu 2007),Qingdai
renwu zhuangao ½Biographical drafts of the people under theQing (Qingshi
bianwei hui 1984), privately edited nianpu (chronicles), and biographies
written by scholars. In addition to these sources, I have extensively used the
published memorials of the frontier military governors, local gazetteers, as
well as secondary works. Relying on these sources, I will show that the rise
and fall of the frontier governance system, rather than the events of political
centralization, state collapse and nationalization, most appropriately ex-
plains the timing of the Mongolian separatism.16LAND REFORM AND A BROKERAGE SYSTEM UNDER
THE FRONTIER MILITARY GOVERNORS, 1900–11
Land reform was part of the New Policy Reform (xinzheng) launched by
the Qing court after China’s defeat in the ﬁrst Sino-Japanese war (1895).16Even though I have tried to let the Mongols speak in my narratives, currently I still
lack sufﬁcient sources to enrich their proﬁles and activities. I hope this defect can be
rectiﬁed through future research.
means of incorporating Inner Asian areas bordering on China Proper within the Chinese
administrative system” (p. 303). The ting were governed as an extension of border
provinces, but they were often directly managed by the provincial military circuits
rather than being tightly organized into a subunit of provincial prefectures.
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American Journal of Sociology
AlThe New Policy Reform resembled the Ottoman Tanzimat reform of 1839
and the Russian Great Reform of the 1860s in terms of the goal to increase
state capacity and the integration of local society.17 The Chinese name for
the land reform is fangken (land reclamation).18 Its most important goal was
to ofﬁcially open the grazing land—hitherto exclusively reserved for the
Mongols—for agrarian cultivation. Banners consenting to open their lands
were required ﬁrst to submit thorough land-register books to the emperor,
who subsequently sent special superintendents to conduct onsite land sur-
veys. The superintendents, often commanded by the frontier military gov-
ernors, organized land cultivation bureaus in speciﬁc locations/areas and
pooled Chinese land merchants and peasants who were willing to take the
land. The superintendents sold licenses to cultivators who wanted to pur-
chase cultivation rights and helped to collect land rent and taxes. All these
new initiatives greatly ampliﬁed sources of state revenue.19 By criminaliz-
ing private land transactions, the superintendents also transferred an im-
portant part of Mongolian land rights to the state and allowed the state to
dictate the distribution of land income and compensation paid to Mongols
who had lost their land. These actions therefore indicated progress in po-
litical centralization.
Moreover, throughout the land reform process, the frontier military gov-
ernors were elevated above other actors in the frontier governance system.
They enlisted support from both the Mongol banners and the Han Chinese
migrant elites, thus becoming the most powerful brokers in frontier land
transactions. Since the frontiermilitary governorswere delegates dispatched
by the court, their strengthened presence in Mongolian politics is another
sign of political centralization. Why this trend of centralization did not pro-
vokeMongolian separatism is the key question I will answer in this section.
The centralization of land rights did not result in direct state control of
Mongolian affairs. Rather, this centralization process was accompanied
by the consolidation of the frontier governance system as an intermediate
body between the state and the frontier, Mongols and Han. Relying on the
support of both Mongol banners and Han Chinese migrants, the frontier
military governors greatly increased the integration of the frontier gover-
nance system. They reduced unwanted interventions from Lifan yuan and
the neighboring Han Chinese provinces, and they bridged the Mongolian
and Han Chinese administrations. If the prereform frontier governance17For a general introduction to the New Policy Reform, see Ichiko (1980).
18Fangken in Chinese literally means “to open and plow new soil.” I am here using the
translation by Tighe (2005, p. 102).
19According to Baoyu (1985, p. 38) between 1902 and 1911 approximately 2,641,200
silver taels were collected from the Wild Land Money (yahuang yin) and the Land Price
Money (dijia yin) imposed during fangken in Suiyuan.
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From Masterly Brokers to Compliant Protégéessystem manifested a loosely assembled structure in which the Mongolian
banners, Lifan yuan, the frontier military governors, and the expanded Han
Chinese administrative units each occupied a separate functioning niche,
the postreform governance system was characterized by pervasive connec-
tions among these components. This new system became a solid intermedi-
ate body, transﬁgured the center-periphery linkages, andgreatly diffused the
pressure of political centralization. The following discussion will show how
this system mitigated the impact of centralization that would have in-
creased ethnic tensions.Change of the Governance Structure
Unlike Lifan yuan, whose interaction with theMongols was highly codiﬁed
and therefore unlikely to change, the frontier military governors’ role was
poorly speciﬁed. Other than guarding frontier security, their responsibili-
ties varied according to special needs. Their thorough knowledge of fron-
tier affairs and their ability to handle delicate situations rendered them
ideal candidates to implement the land reforms. Frontier military gover-
nors performed two actions that increased the integration of the frontier
governance system.Onewas to take control of both land cultivation bureaus
and the Han Chinese subprefectures. The other was to penetrate banner
affairs and reduce the connections between banners and the Lifan yuan.
These measures tightly welded the interests of the Mongol banners, the
Manchu military governors, and the Han Chinese migrant elites. They
fortiﬁed the intermediate governing body that ultimately became an im-
portant buffering mechanism of the center-periphery relationship in late
imperial China. I will use the story of Yigu, one of the most important
frontier military governors, to illustrate the restructuring process.
The Manchu ofﬁcial Yigu was the best-known superintendent of land
cultivation and the best-known military governor in Inner Mongolia. Be-
fore being appointed as Suiyuan jiangjun in 1903, Yigu demonstrated his
ability to handle Mongolian affairs while serving in the position of super-
intendent of land cultivation. He established land cultivation bureaus in
Suiyuan (duban mengqi kenwu zongju) and Fengning (Fengning kenwuju)
to take care of the land affairs in the right banners of Chakhar. He also
established a bureau in Zhangjiakou (Zhangjiakou kenwu zongju) to man-
age land affairs in the left banners ofChakhar. Moreover, he established the
Western Leagues Land Cultivation Bureau for the Ulaanchab and Yekhe
Juu leagues. In September 1902, Yigu set up the East and West Land Rec-
lamation Companies in charge of the land affairs in the Chakhar, Ulaan-
chab, and Yekhe Juu leagues. These institutions were preserved and reg-
ularizedwhen hemoved from superintendent to Suiyuan jiangjun (formore
details, see Zhao [1989, pp. 157–60] and Su-de-bi-li-ge [2005, pp. 78–79]).1655
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AlAt this time, as we know, Han Chinese migrants ﬂooded into Inner
Mongolia and challenged the tenuous Han Chinese administration that
was sparsely stationed in the subprefectures. Consequently, subprefectures
multiplied (Tighe 2005, pp. 65). These newly created Chinese local gov-
ernments were initially controlled by the adjacent provinces, whose inﬂu-
ence was contested by Yigu. In one memorial, Yigu stated that even though
the frontier military governors were not supposed to interfere with the ju-
risdiction of subprefectures, as land reform proceeded and thorny disputes
between HanChinese andMongols increased, a uniﬁed civil administration
as created by the military governors was indispensible. The uniﬁed civil ad-
ministration allowed the military governors to coherently handle the Mon-
golian and Han Chinese affairs simultaneously.20
These developments greatly increased the administrative capacity of the
frontier military governors. Yigu’s inﬂuence rapidly grew among Han Chi-
nese land speculators and migrants. As a result, the line previously dividing
Han Chinese administration and frontier garrisons was trespassed. This
happened at the same time that the frontier military governors expanded
their inﬂuence in the Mongolian civil administration.
Fangken generated “a climate of opportunism” (Atwood 2002, p. 45) and
spurred many poverty-stricken Mongol nobles to solicit favors from the
military governors. Many petty nobles and even commoners strove to gain
a share of land income. Gradually the banner governments were subju-
gated to themilitary governors.While dealing with the nobles’ requests and
petitions, the frontier military governors tried to circumscribe interven-
tions from Lifan yuan, the main institution ofﬁcially authorized to handle
Mongolian affairs.
In 1901, in response to the Ulaanchab league’s adamant rejection of
opening its lands, Yigu appealed to Lifan yuan for assistance. TheGuangxu
emperor issued a decree that Lifan yuan should order the Ulaanchab and
Yekhe Juu leagues to comply with the order (K. Li 1990, p. 133). However,
as land reform progressed, Yigu’s attitude toward Lifan yuan changed. In
a supplementary memorial sent on September 8, 1905, Yigu bitterly rep-
rimanded Lifan yuan for its inappropriate claim of sharing the beneﬁts of
land cultivation.21 Obviously, Yigu was trying to attenuate the control of
Lifan yuan over the Mongol banners.
In short, the frontier military governors’ efforts to monopolize control of
bothHan-Chinese subprefectures andMongol banners resulted in the amal-20See Yigu, “Zouwei zunyi Suiyuan jiansheng yi gu bianwei jin tiao ni dagai banfa
gongzhe yangqi” ½Memorial proposing the method of establishing a province in Suiyuan
to consolidate the frontier defense, August 6, Guangxu year 33 (1907), collected in Yigu
(1974, pp. 321–38).
21Yigu, supplementary memorial, September 8, Guangxu year 31 (1905), collected in
Yigu (1974, pp. 369–70).
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From Masterly Brokers to Compliant Protégéesgamation of the Manchu garrisons, the Han Chinese subprefectures, and
the Mongol banners. All the pockets of multiethnic administration were
placed under the supervision of the frontier military governors (ﬁg. 3 shows
the new Mongolian governance structure after the land reform). The inte-
gration of the frontier governance system paved the way for the new ter-
ritorial division of Inner Mongolia in the early Republic of China.22 It also
facilitated state control without, however, imposing a crude form of direct
rule.Why Didn’t Separatism Occur?
According to center-periphery explanations, once the lax control over the
periphery was tightened by the central state, the seeds of peripheral resis-
tance and separatism would be planted. In the China case, land reform
undoubtedly centralized state control of theMongolian land, since theMon-
gols were deprived of the freedom to keep and sell their land. The original
political autonomy of the Mongol banners was also curtailed because, after
the reform, the banners had to appeal for approval from the frontier mili-
tary governorswhenhandling their own landaffairs. It is true that compared
with the Ottoman Tanzimat reform, land reform on the China–Inner Mon-
golia frontier lacked a strong agenda of cultural homogenization.23 Despite
the low intensity of cultural homogenization, centralization itself should
have generated great discontent among the Mongols, according to center-
periphery theory. Why did centralization fail to instigate Mongolian sepa-
ratism in this case?
To explain this puzzle, we need to consider the structure of the frontier
governance system. As an intermediate body, it shows strong characteristics
of a brokerage system, with the frontier military governors acting as bro-
kers between the center and periphery, Han and Mongols. I have shown
how, by reducing the connections betweenMongol banners andLifan yuan,
the frontier military governors mediated the center-periphery relationship.
In the following discussion, I will use evidence of their activities to show
how they mediated Mongol-Han interactions in the land reform.22 In 1912, Yuan Shikai (1859–1916), the president of the new Republic of China,
ordered the Shanxi province to give up 12 counties (12 subprefectures under the Qing)
under the Guisui circuit and put them under the supervision of Suiyuan jiangjun.
Meanwhile he ordered the incorporation of Suiyuan town and Ulaanchab and Yekhee
Juu leagues, making them into one special district (Zhang 1984, p. 57). In the same
manner, Yuan ordered the establishment of Jehol and Chakhar special districts. These
three special districts were led by the three military governors.
23Xiliang was another important military governor actively participating in the land
reform. Among his memorials (Xiliang 1959), I found seven directly addressing the land
issue, ﬁve on local administration, four on mineral exploration, three on taxation, two on
military reorganization, ﬁve on bandits. Only two addressed educational matters.
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FIG. 3.—Inner Mongolian Governance Structure, 1900–1917
American Journal of Sociology
AlI will ﬁrst reveal the collective identity of the frontier military governors,
an important aspect illuminating their brokering ability. The change of
collective leadership identity is highlighted in many studies on revolution
and state formation.24 Categorizing the biographical data of early Soviet
leaders, Riga (2008) discloses an interesting afﬁnity between the minority
middle-class elite and the Russian proletariat that explains the dual char-
acter of the Russian revolution as both a social revolution as well as a mi-
nority ethnic revolution. Prasenjit Duara’s (1988) book on northernChinese
local politics also reveals that the reshufﬂing of local leadership is key to
understanding state penetration in modern China. I will use biographical
data to demonstrate that the brokering ability of the frontier military gov-
ernors was not only attributed to the unique position they occupied in the
frontier governance system, but also to their collective identity.
It is evident that before the domination of warlordism, the frontier mil-
itary governors shared a common identity of “central state agents.” I use
this term to emphasize that most of the frontier military governors in this24For example, Wilson (2011) discusses the inﬂuence of the identities of colonial ofﬁcials
on state building.
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From Masterly Brokers to Compliant Protégéesperiod were not born or brought up on the frontier. They were outsiders,
and this identity gave them the ability to play the role of brokers mediating
theMongol-Han interactions.Whenwe study the educational backgrounds
of the frontier military governors between 1900 and 1916 (see table 1), we
ﬁnd a consistent pattern. Most of the frontier military governors in this
period obtained an elite education. They were normally civil examination
degree holders; however, after the examination system was abolished in
1905, many graduated from prestigious state military academies.25 Among
the eight prerevolutionary Manchu military governors, four had exami-
nation degrees just like normal Han Chinese bureaucrats. In addition to
their education, they enjoyed wide bureaucratic networks through the ro-
tation of governors in empire-wide military and civil posts (see the ap-
pendix). Many governors’ careers were characterized by frequent transfers
across frontiers, including Inner Mongolia, Outer Mongolia, and the North-
east. They also held positions in Lifan yuan at various points of their lives.
Some of them, like theHanChinese scholar-ofﬁcials, heldmultiple positions
in the central government (beingHanlin scholars) or local Chinese provinces
(the best example is Xiliang). It is noteworthy that althoughManchu gover-
norswere replacedbyHanChinese governors after the 1911Revolution, this
reshufﬂing did not change the nature of their collective identity.
It is logical to conclude that, before 1916, frontier military governorswere
central state agents, whose authority did not originate in the local political
world. Resorting to the use of central-state agents to break down local ob-
stacles to state penetration was a frequent strategy employed by early mod-
ern European monarchs in the creation of absolutist states (Beik 1985;
Kettering 1986; Lachmann and Adams 1988). By placing frontier military
governors above Mongol nobles in managing land affairs, Chinese emper-
ors greatly strengthened the central-state presence on the frontier.Not rooted
in local societies, central-state agents were often criticized for their relent-
lessly extractive activities in the process of European state formation.26
This however is less true in the China–Inner Mongolia case. As I will later
show, frontier military governors acting as central-state agents tended to be
more lenient toward both Mongols and Han Chinese migrants than their25The rise of militarism in the late Qing period is a signiﬁcant phenomenon. A large
proportion of young Chinese students joined military schools as an alternative career
option when the examination system was abolished. Beiyang Military Academy was
established by Li Hongzhang (1823–1901) in 1885. The school adopted a German-style
modern military education with the goal of training elite military ofﬁcials for China.
Nearly all of the most eminent graduates became inﬂuential political ﬁgures in the early
Republic of China. For that reason, the early Republican government was also called
the “Beiyang government.”
26This has been a classic statement ever since Alexis de Tocqueville. Duara (1988) has a
similar argument about the degeneration of local politics in the process of centralization
in modern China.
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From Masterly Brokers to Compliant Protégéescounterpartspatronizedby localwarlords.The “outsider” identity gave them
credibility to collaborate extensively with indigenous groups, bothMongols
and Han Chinese, without completely aligning with either of them. Quite
ironically, as this brokerage system became more integrated, its interme-
diate character also became more signiﬁcant.
The frequent interactions among frontier military governors, Mongol
banners, and Han Chinese migrants in administering land affairs encour-
aged the growth of solidarity among these three. This was already shown in
theways frontiermilitary governors endeavored toward off the interference
of Lifan Yuan and neighboring Han Chinese provinces in the land reform
operation. Neither did the frontier military governors entirely identify with
the Mongols or the Han Chinese migrants. Instead they brokered Mongol-
Han interactions.
The frontier military governors assured Mongols that their main inten-
tion was not to reap land proﬁts on behalf of the state, but to eliminate the
vices of private land cultivation that had pained the Mongols for years. By
disallowing private land transactions between the Mongols and Han, fron-
tier military governors representing the state became the sole authorities
mediating the Mongol-Han land relationship. As Yigu stated, “In the old
times, the Mongol land was forbidden to be cultivated. However, private
cultivations started early. For current Mongols, their livelihood no longer
depends upon grazing but upon agrarian production. Given that private
cultivation has become popular, it is better for the state to organize and
regularize it, so that Mongols would obtain beneﬁts, while corruption and
exploitation involved in private cultivation would be reduced.”27
Yigu also established the East Company of Land Reclamation primarily
to counteract themonopoly of bigHanChinese landmerchants. He proudly
stated that among the total of over 300,000 taels gained by the East Com-
pany, only 70,000 taelswere shared by landmerchants.28He further rebuked
incorrect land measuring, which caused a big loss of beneﬁt to the Mongols.
Not specifying the location and size of land in private land contracts gave27Suiyuan tongzhi gao (Suiyuan Gazetteer) was composed by Suiyuan tongzhi guan in
1937. It is the most complete local history of Inner Mongolia. It contains primary sources
on the major events happening in Suiyuan history, especially in the early Republican
period. This collection sustained some damage during the Sino-Japanese war. After the
war, about 113 volumes remained intact. I used the most recently edited version (2007),
published by Neimenggu renmin chuban she, which contains 100 volumes. The quo-
tation comes from Qing Guanxu jian Yigu zhuban mengken shimo ½Chronicle of Yigu’s
supervision in Mongolian land cultivation, collected in Suiyuan tongzhi guan (2007
[vol. 38], p. 194).
28See Qing Guangxu jian Yigu zhuban mengken shimo ½Chronicle of Yigu’s supervi-
sion in Mongolian land cultivation, collected in Suiyuan tongzhi guan (2007 [vol. 38],
p. 195).
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Alrise to enormous land disputes as time went on.29 Worse than that, without
ofﬁcial regulations, Yigu noted, “fake tenants occupied the land. Some un-
ruly tenants refused to pay their rent. As a result, Mongols lost their sub-
sistence, because they lost their land through the extended chains of ten-
ancy. Some greedy Mongols colluded with sneaky Han Chinese and rented
the same plot of banner common land to multiple tenants. These tricks
gave them immense proﬁts at the expense of the interests of the majority of
Mongols.”30
Banning private land cultivation henceforth cut off direct land trans-
actions between Mongols and Han, consequently mitigating land disputes
between them. In addition, frontier military governors adapted policies to
suit the divergent needs of Mongols and Han Chinese migrants.
When providing compensation to Mongols who lost their land, the fron-
tier military governors avoided a uniform and clear-cut policy. They tried
to accommodate the complex classiﬁcations used by the Mongols to dif-
ferentiate the status and privileges of land. It could be wild/cultivated land
(based upon its cultivation status), good/medium/poor land (based upon its
location and fertility), or various categories of privileged land. Privileged
land was granted as a means to show imperial favor to certain ofﬁcials,
banner governments and garrisons, and individual herdsman. It included
land owned by local subprefecture governments, the rice lands of the Sui-
yuan government, the land of post relay stations, and the land of Manchu
princes who married Mongol nobles. It also included the subsistence land
of Mongol nobles and commoners, ofﬁcial grazing land, the land of those
households without descendants, and temple lands, among others. I call
these lands “privileged land” to emphasize that they were treated differ-
ently from the ordinary land. They were not subject to being opened, and
greater compensation was usually paid if they were.31
To the Han Chinese migrants who paid for land licenses and land taxes,
frontier military governors tried to adapt to their diversity as well. They
distinguished between wild (shengdi) and cultivated land (shudi), the latter
designating land privately rented out by individual Mongol nobles to Han
peasants before fangken. Both kinds of land were surveyed and opened
under strict supervision, but the price of a license for each differed. The29See Yigu’s memorial sent on Dec. 2 of Guangxu year 27 (1901), Kenwu zouyi [Yigu’s
Memorials about land cultivation], collected in Suiyuan tongzhi guan 2007 [vol. 38],
p. 204.
30See Can an diaocha ji (Investigation of Yigu’s Misdemeanor in Land Reclamation),
Guangxu year 31 (1905), collected in Suiyuan tongzhi guan (2007 [vol. 38], p. 235).
31For more details, see Can an diaocha ji, collected in Suiyuan tongzhi guan (2007
[vol. 38], p. 269).
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From Masterly Brokers to Compliant Protégéestenants of wild land paid more to get the license than did those seeking cul-
tivated land.32
To reassure the Han Chinese migrants, the frontier military governors
made great efforts to reduce land prices, postpone the deadlines of rent
payments, increase loans of grain seeds, and lend peasants plow instru-
ments. They also facilitated the establishment of irrigation systems and
provided other assistance.33 They granted a ﬁve-year grace period to mi-
grants before their land became taxable. On many occasions, that grace
period could be extended up to eight years.34
The stabilization of Han Chinese settlements was vital to the consolida-
tion of the frontier governance system because the funding for local gov-
ernment came from the Han Chinese migrants who purchased licenses and
paid rent. Without these funds, the local administration could barely un-
dertake infrastructure development, such as constructing roads and build-
ing schools.Without the migrants, the extra ﬁscal burdens would have been
imposed on the Mongols. Moreover, the Han Chinese migrants also ﬁnan-
cially supported the Mongolian communities. A great portion of the income
from selling land licenses to Han Chinese migrants went back to the Mon-
gol banners and lamaseries, which lost land ownership in the reform. Sta-
bilizing the situation of Han Chinese migrants therefore allowed the evo-
lution of complementary political and economic relationshipswithMongols.
In sum, although land reform greatly reduced Mongolian autonomy in
land ownership and governance while simultaneously increasing state au-
thority on the frontier, it did not provoke Mongolian separatism. The main
reason for this is that the reforms consolidated an intermediate body of
governance rather than imposing a crude form of state control. This inter-
mediate body was a brokerage system that centered on the frontier military
governors, who successfully mediated center-periphery relationships, in-
cluding the land relationship betweenMongols and Han Chinese. Mongols
lost the right to deal freely with their land, but they gained great compen-
sation from Han Chinese migrants who bought licenses to cultivate the
land. Although freed of the tax obligation, Mongols did not completely part
with their land because they claimed a great share of the land rents and even
some part of the land taxes. On the other hand, Han Chinese migrants
obtained arable land that was unavailable in other parts of China.32 Ibid.
33See Qing Guanxu jian Yigu zhuban mengken shimo [Chronicle of Yigu’s supervision
in Mongolian land cultivation], collected in Suiyuan tongzhi guan (2007 [vol. 38], p. 20).
34Yao Xiguang, Choumeng chuyi ½Preliminary suggestions on the management of
Mongolian affairs, 1908. This document is a historical source dated. Yao Xiguang was
a late Qing ofﬁcial known for his experienced insights on frontier matters. The source is
collected in Neimenggu tushuguan (2008, pp. 38–39). For more on the conservation of
the Mongolian prerogatives in land, see Wang (2014).
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AlThemigrants paid land rent and taxes, at a price considerably lower than
in other places in China. They were thus willing to take on the economic
burden of supporting local government operations. Thus, through the me-
diating efforts of the frontier military governors, land cultivation did not
become a devastating event exacerbating theMongol-Han relationship that
gravely jeopardized the interests of the minorities. Instead it generated a
complementary relationship between Mongols and Han Chinese migrants.
The operation of this brokerage system ensured that although a signiﬁcant
degree of centralization was ongoing, its pressure was diffused and thus did
not provoke minority separatism.REVOLUTION AND THE INTERREGNUM PERIOD
What happened through the land reform reveals that state centralization
was embodied not by the growth of the central state apparatus, but by the
growth of the brokers’ power, that is, the frontier military governors, who
were the hinge connecting the center and periphery, Mongols and Han Chi-
nese. After land reform, China underwent another series of events epito-
mized by the 1911 Revolution, a Chinese nationalist revolution that over-
threw nearly 300 years of Manchu rule. The collapse of Manchu rule and
the substitution of frontier governors by the Han Chinese was expected by
some to bring an unprecedented crisis of Mongolian separatism in the fron-
tier (Crossley 2005; Esherick 2006; Friskesjo 2006). Yet, this possibility did
not materialize. Again focusing on the intermediate body of governance, I
will explain this puzzle.
Contrary to the expectation that Mongols would split from the new Chi-
nese republic, my ﬁndings, based on new archival sources, show that Mon-
gols continuously adhered to the leadership of the frontiermilitarygovernors
even when the latter were not Manchu but Han Chinese. The functioning
of the brokerage system seemed undisturbed by the switch fromManchu to
Han Chinese military governors. Not only the Mongols, but also the Han
Chinese migrants exhibited a strong inclination to keep the frontier gover-
nance system intact. The Mongols might have been vaguely worried about
the downfall of the Manchu rule and the upcoming Chinese nationalist re-
public, but this general concern did not translate into speciﬁc hostility to-
ward the domination of Han Chinese military governors, nor toward local
Han Chinese migrants. Instead, Mongols continued to collaborate with the
Han Chinese migrants, under the mediating efforts of the frontier military
governors. The frontier seemed to be buffered from the calamitous reper-
cussions generated by the collapse of the imperial center.
Other than temporary disorder, the most important repercussion was
caused by the new Republic’s attempt to unify the frontier administration.
In 1912, Lifan yuan was renamed Mengzang shiwu ju (Bureau of Mongo-1664
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From Masterly Brokers to Compliant Protégéeslian andTibetan Affairs). This new institutionwas subordinate to the direct
leadership of Nei wu bu (Department of Domestic Affairs) rather than the
president of the Republic of China. Its formation went in tandem with new
policies formally annulling the “dependency” status of Mongols. These ef-
forts at homogenizing, or sinicizing, frontier institutionswere atﬁrst resisted
by the frontier military governors, who, though beingHanChinese, refused
to follow the orders of the central government.
Zhang Shaozeng was then Suiyuan jiangjun, leading a garrison army
overseeing the security of the western leagues of Inner Mongolia. In his pe-
tition to the Bureau of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs on November 13,
1912, Zhang claimed that the announcement of April 21, 1912, was at the
root of Mongolian dissent.35 That announcement sketched out the basic
principle of wuzu gonghe (“The Republic of Five Nations”) and highlighted
the goal to eliminate the fanshu (literally translated as “the dependencies”)
status of frontier peoples. Remonstrating on behalf of the Mongols, Zhang
pleaded for the central government to hold off on administrative uniﬁcation.
He emphasized that most Mongol nobles would resent the abolition of de-
pendencies, because they suspected that this would destroy their traditions
and religion. A similar intervention was made by Rongxun, a Mongol ofﬁ-
cial then entrusted by president Yuan Shikai to pacify the Mongols in the
northeast in 1912.36
These interventions show that the new republican government attempted
to centralize administrative control and standardize frontier governance.
They also show that this attempt was resisted (at least somewhat) by fron-
tier governors. It seems that the ethnic identity of themilitary governors was
not pertinent to their ability to function in the frontier governance system.
Administrative uniﬁcation was a goal not only pursued by the central gov-
ernment, but also by the neighboring Han Chinese provinces that wished
to expand territorial control by formally annexing Han Chinese governing
units located in Inner Mongolia. Although facing this encroachment from
both sides,Mongols andHanChinesemigrantswere not split by their ethnic
differences.
In an attempt to encroach upon theMongolian administration, the neigh-
boring Han Chinese provinces tried to move the administration of the Han35Yimeng Suiyuancheng Cha-ha-er dutong deng guanyu difang zhidu deng wenti gei
Meng zang yuan zi cheng deng gongwen ½Ofﬁcial reports sent by Suiyuan jiangjun and
Chakhar dutong about the issues of local institutions and etc., Meng Zang Yuan
Dang’an (hereafter MZYD), Quanzongjuan 440, anjuanhao 23. The MZYD are the
archives of the Department of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs. I consulted copies of this
source now located at the Center of Mongolian Studies at Inner Mongolian University.
The original source is located at the Second Historical Archives of China in Nanjing.
36The report sent by Rongxun (the vice director of the Bureau of Mongolian and
Tibetan Affairs) to the president and the prime minister on November 23, 1912, Da-
zongtong, Mengzangyuan dui ge mengqi youguan difang zhidu zi cheng chentiao deng
1665
This content downloaded from 147.008.230.123 on August 23, 2016 19:30:56 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
American Journal of Sociology
AlChinese migrants under provincial control. However, the migrants showed
a strong inclination to align with the frontier military governors rather than
the neighboring Han Chinese provincial authorities. In a letter sent by the
JeholNative Association (Re-he tongxiang hui ) to the president and theGuo
wu yuan (State Council),37 the leaders of the Han Chinese migrants in Jehol
stated that they, like the Mongols, preferred to stay under the administra-
tion of the Jehol military governor. They objected to administrative parti-
tioning with the Mongols and disliked the idea of being transferred to the
direct administration of the Zhili province. They implored the central gov-
ernment not to endorse this provincial ambition. They insisted that the newly
created Chinese administrative units in Chifeng and Chaoyang should still
be placed under Jehol rather than the Zhili administration. They even went
so far as to suggest converting Jehol into a special administrative region, so
as to completely sever its connections with Zhili province.
Like the Han Chinese migrants, the Mongols perceived a threat in the
movement toward administrative uniﬁcation. They recalcitrantly objected
to annexation by the neighboring Zhili province of the Han Chinese ad-
ministration in Jehol. In the telegraph sent by the Kharachin right-wing
banner in 1912,38 the Kharachin prince declared that he was offended by
the idea of splitting the Han Chinese from the Mongolian administration
and allocating the former to the control of Zhili province.
The reactions of the Kharachin prince, the Chinese migrant elite, and
the frontier military governors show that these three parties were united in
their opposition to administrative uniﬁcation. Their common interests, in-37The letter sent by the Jehol Native Association to the President and Guowuyuan [un-
dated; but judging from the response sent back by the Bureau ofMongolian and Tibetan
Affairs, the letter was probably written before October 15, 1912], Yimeng Suiyuancheng
Cha-ha-er dutong deng guanyu difang zhidu deng wenti gei Mengzangyuan zi cheng
deng gongwen [Ofﬁcial reports sent by Suiyuan general and Chakhar dutong about
the issues of local institutions and etc.], MZYD, Quanzongjuan 440, anjuanhao 23.
38Telegraph sent by Kharachin right-wing banner to the president, the state council,
senate and the Bureau of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, on November 22, 1912,
Yimeng Suiyuan cheng Cha-ha-er dutong deng guanyu difang zhidu deng wenti gei
Mengzangyuan zi cheng deng gongwen [Ofﬁcial reports sent by Suiyuan general and
Chakhar dutong about the issues of local institutions and etc.], MZYD, Quanzongjuan
440, anjuanhao 23. The Kharachin prince’s concern was explicit in the message sent by
Lu Zhongdai, the person sent by the central government to collect information in Inner
Mongolia. See Lu’s telegraph sent to the president, the state council, the bureau of
Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs on December 1, 1912, Yimeng Suiyuancheng Cha-ha-er
dutong deng guanyu difang zhidu deng wenti gei Mengzangyuan zi cheng deng gong-
wen [Ofﬁcial reports sent by Suiyuan general and Chakhar dutong about the issues of
local institutions and etc.], MZYD, Quanzongjuan 440, anjuanhao 23.
gongwen de zhaofu ½The president’s and the Department of Mongolian and Tibetan
Affairs’ responses to the reports and petitions on the local institutions of the Mongolian
banners and leagues, MZYD, Quanzongjuan 440, anjuanhao 22.
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From Masterly Brokers to Compliant Protégéescipiently growing out of the land reform, were fortiﬁed after the outbreak
of the revolution. Their resistance supports my argument that the frontier
governance system, as an intermediate body, was an important buffering
agent between the center and periphery in China. This highly integrated
system cushioned the repercussions of the revolution and the succeeding
regime’s administrative uniﬁcation (or homogenization) initiatives. The
new republican government quickly realized that to harness, rather than
break down, this intermediate linkage would be more beneﬁcial to the sta-
bility of the frontier.39
In sum, the 1911 Revolution eliminated Manchu rule and unleashed
temporary disorder. After the revolution, both the central government and
the neighboring Han Chinese provinces embarked upon plans for admin-
istrative uniﬁcation. These changes might have provoked or generated op-
portunities for Mongolian separatism, but that did not happen. This anom-
alous result is largely attributable to the stability of the frontier governance
system. Unfortunately, the equilibrium maintained by that system met a
real challenge following the rise of provincial warlordism in the 1920s. The
frontier governance system quickly fell apart thereafter, and Mongolian
separatism emerged at that historical juncture.ETHNIC SEPERATISM AND WARLORDS’ RULE, 1917–27
A new level of political fragmentation emerged in the late 1910s, after the
death of Yuan Shikai, the charismatic leader of the early Republiccan gov-
ernment. In the absence of a strong center, various northern Chinese pro-
vincial governors attempted to expand their own inﬂuence. These people
became belligerent warlords, using their provincial bases to build up local
states for the purposes of combating each other. The warlords tried to an-
nex parts of the frontier to their own provincial territories. In the scramble
for theMongolian frontier, they used their own conﬁdants to replace former
frontier military governors. Consequently, the brokerage system was shat-
tered. Inner Mongolian separatism broke out at this juncture.The Rise of Warlordism
Yuan Shikai’s death in 1916 marked the critical turning point, changing
China from a relatively uniﬁed regime to a fragmented one. None of Yuan’s39The document sent by the Bureau of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs to the Guo-
wuyuan on October 15, 1912, Yimeng Suiyuancheng Cha-ha-er dutong deng guanyu
difang zhidu deng wenti gei Mengzangyuan zi cheng deng gongwen ½Ofﬁcial reports sent
by Suiyuan general and Chakhar dutong about the issues of local institutions and etc.,
MZYD, Quanzongjuan 440, anjuanhao 23.
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Alsuccessors (e.g., Li Yuanhong [1864–1928], Duan Qirui [1865–1936], Feng
Guozhang [1859–1919], CaoKun [1862–1938] and others) were able tomain-
tain even a semblance of uniﬁcation.40 According to Chi Hsi-sheng (1976,
p. 2), from 1926 to 1928, the cabinet was reshufﬂed about 24 times and 26
persons held the post of prime minister. The longest tenure was 17 months,
and the shortest was two days. The average tenure ran from three to ﬁve
months.
Before 1920, political competition was conﬁned to factions within the
central government and did not involve localmilitarists.41DuanQirui, Feng
Guozhang, and Cao Kun, each of whom served as president, were all out-
standing graduates of the BeiyangMilitary Academy. Things changed after
1920 when local power contenders joined the competition for political au-
thority at the center. After Feng Guozhang’s death, the discord between
Feng’s successor, Cao Kun, and Duan Qirui magniﬁed, eventually driving
the outbreak of the Anfu-Zhili War in 1920. Zhang Zuolin (1875–1918), a
local warlord in Manchuria who had grown to be the most daunting power
holder in the northeast, joined the war and aligned with Cao.42 In 1922 and
1924, respectively, two wars broke out between Zhang Zuolin and Cao
Kun, prefacingwarlordism inChina.Twootherwarlords also became rising
stars in the 1920s political theater of north China—Feng Yuxiang and Yan
Xishan.
Feng Yuxiang was both an enemy and an ally of Zhang Zuolin. He ac-
quired his ﬁrst territorial base in 1921while serving as themilitary governor
of Shaanxi (for details, see Jiang [2003], pp. 54–55). After the ﬁrst Zhili-
Fengtian War in 1922, Feng obtained the territory of Henan. Yan Xishan
had acquired his territorial base much earlier, before the 1911 Revolution.
A Shanxi native, he graduated from Shanxi Military Academy and initi-
ated an impressive military reorganization in Shanxi as early as 1911.43 Yan40Once the revolution ﬁrst broke out in southern China, the postrevolutionary central
government only nominally retained control over the southern provinces. After 1911,
the term “Chinese central government” mostly refers to the northern government.
41Before 1920, the most powerful local militarists, such as Zhang Zuolin (1875–1928),
Feng Yuxiang (1882–1948), and Yan Xishan (1883–1960), each of whom played a
signiﬁcant role in frontier politics during the 1920s, were still minor ﬁgures. For details
see Sheridan (1966, pp. 37, 51, 100) and Gillin (1967, p. 23).
42Zhang moved to the center of the political stage in the northeast only after the
revolution erupted. To defeat the disobedient revolutionary forces, the Qing court
summoned Zhang Zuolin’s provincial army for help (McCormack 1977, pp. 18–25).
After the revolution, Zhang continued to build up his power with a local focus in
Fengtian province (present-day Liaoning). He was able to expand his domination into
Heilongjiang in 1917 and Jilin in 1919, incorporating the three northeastern provinces
under his control (McCormack 1977, pp. 34–36).
43By 1911, Yan Xishan was still a regiment commander in the Shanxi army. His mil-
itary reform programs included recruiting more native Shanxi soldiers. See Yan Bo-
chuan xiansheng jinian hui (1988, pp. 33–34).
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From Masterly Brokers to Compliant Protégéesappeared to be less ambitious than Feng Yuxiang or Zhang Zuolin, al-
though he steadily secured domination in Shanxi through a strategy of iso-
lation—not fully engaging in these factional wars.
These three major warlords consecutively monopolized Chinese north-
ern politics before Chiang Kai-shek’s Northern Expedition in 1927. The
period of 1917–27 saw the fragmentation of northern politics, due to the
collapse of central government and the rise of local warlords. Since these
warlords’ territorial bases were provinces abutting the Inner Mongolian
frontier, their domination profoundly affected the stability of the Inner
Mongolian governance system.A New Change in the Governance Structure
The provincial warlords’ regimes generated a new reservoir of frontier mil-
itary governors. The educational backgrounds and administrative experi-
ences of the military governors in Inner Mongolia between 1917 and 1928
display an entirely different pattern than was typical of those who served
in that role before 1917. This new pattern became discernible around 1920
(see table 2 and app. table A2), a critical time when local warlords started
participating in a nationwide competition for political power. Between 1917
and 1920, there was no abrupt deviation in the composition of frontier mil-
itary governors. Consistent with the pattern before 1916, three Suiyuan du-
tong (Jiang Yanxing, Chen Guangyuan, and Cai Chengxun) were all grad-
uates of the Beiyang Military Academy. The two Chakhar dutong (Tian
Zhongyu and Wang Tingzhen) were also Beiyang Military Academy grad-
uates. Another Chakhar dutong, Zhang Jinyao, graduated from Baoding
Military Academy, the school established by Yuan Shikai to succeed the
BeiyangMilitary Academy.
The case of Jehol dutong is slightly different, because the major dutong,
Jiang Guiti, who retained control the longest, did not have any formal ed-
ucation. His prestige was mainly based upon military performance. Jiang
was an oldmember of the Yi army, a branch of Li Hongzhang’s Huai army,
which was the most powerful military organization before the establish-
ment of Beiyang Military Academy. Despite this difference, Jiang, like his
peers, had a career colored by nationwide administrative experience before
taking the position in Inner Mongolia.
These leaders were the last vestige of an eclipsing cohort of central state
agents. Their inﬂuence decayed after 1920 when local warlords moved into
the national political theater. Chen Guangyuan and Cai Chengxun retired
in 1924 after the defeat of the Zhili clique in the war. Tian Zhongyu was
deposed in 1923. That same year, Wang Tingzhen resigned, disappointed
by the civil war. Jiang Guiti died earlier, before the civil war fully exploded.
Only Zhang Jingyao was still active in politics after the 1920s. He ﬁrst1669
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From Masterly Brokers to Compliant Protégéesjoined with Zhang Zuolin and Zhang Zongchang and then went on to join
the Japanese puppet government in Manchuria (Manchuko). This last ves-
tige of central state agents had almost disappeared from frontier politics in
the early 1920s. Their retreat left vacancies to be occupied by conﬁdants of
the local warlords.
After 1920, a new group of ofﬁcials emerged who were protégées of the
rising local warlords (see app. table A2). Fourteen of them had strong ties
with the three major local warlords. Six were trustworthy subordinates of
Feng Yuxiang. Some (e.g., Zhang Zhijiang) were close comrades of Feng
while he was still a petty ofﬁcial in the Northeast. Some (e.g., Liu Yufen,
Song Zheyuan, Zhang Zhijiang, Lu Zhonglin) grew up in the 16th mixed
brigade of the Chinese army (then called the Beiyang army) directly com-
manded by Feng in his early years. Others (Li Mingzhong and Zhang Zhi-
jiang) enjoyed Feng’s patronage in Henan and Shaanxi. In a similar fash-
ion, six conﬁdants of Zhang Zuolin (e.g., Guo Xipeng, Ji Jinchun, Zhang
Jinhui, GaoWeiyue, Gan Chaoxi, and Tang Yulin) all grew up in Zhang’s
Fengtian army.
The background of Yan Xishan’s protégées, Shang Zhen and Zhao
Daiwen, was less clear-cut. Shang joined the new army in the northeast
before the revolution and brieﬂy worked in the army dispatched to Shaanxi
under Lu Jianzhang’s leadership. Despite this overlap with Feng Yuxiang,
Shang Zhen joined YanXishan in 1915 and loyally served the Shanxi army
thereafter. ZhaoDaiwenwas a distinguished civilian ofﬁcial, but also a core
member of the Shanxi clique.44 All of these ofﬁcials had narrow adminis-
trative experiences. They exclusively worked for individual warlords.
Compared to their predecessors, these men were characterized by an in-
ferior education (see table 2). Among them, ﬁve (Li Mingzhong, Liu Yufen,
Jiang Hongyu, Shang Zhen, Zhang Jingyao) ofﬁcially graduated from the
military school in Baoding. One, Song Zheyuan, received a short, informal
military training in the in-service divisional school of the Sixth Division.
Three (GuoXipeng,GaoWeiyue, andGanChaoxi) were educated locally in
military schools in the northeast sponsored by Zhang Zuolin himself, while
three others (Zhang Zhijiang, Lu Zhonglin, and Tang Yuling) do not seem
to have had any formal education; their military careers began in the ranks.44The other ﬁve people were singular cases that had more ambiguous connections. Ma
Fuxiang was a Muslim general whose power was steadily stabilized in the Gansu and
Qinghai regions where the Muslim Chinese (the Hui people) predominated. Therefore
Ma was not a negligible person in northwestern politics. Rather, he was deemed an in-
ﬂuential balancing power in the northwestern frontier and was frequently appealed to
by multiple competing forces in Inner Mongolia. Mantai was aMongolian revolutionary
and his brief tenure as Suiyuan dutong was nothing more than an accident. Zhang Xi-
yuan was a semiloyalist to Feng Yuxiang because he joined Feng Yuxiang only after the
defeat of the Zhili clique. He did not belong to Feng’s core, as is demonstrated by the fact
that he retired after 1924.
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AlTwo (Ji Jinchun and Wang Jinhui) were outlaws before joining Zhang
Zuolin’s forces.
These new military governors no longer represented a “disinterested”
third party and could no longer play the role of brokers in handling frontier
affairs. Being protégées of local warlords, they worked for the warlords’
regimes and heralded the Chinese provincial expedition into the Mongo-
lian frontier. Figure 4 illustrates the Inner Mongolian governance structure
during the period of warlordism.
This new structure shows that a uniﬁed central government was replaced
by competing regional governments headed by Chinese warlords. The De-
partment of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, the counterpart to Lifan yuan,
no longer actively functioned. Concomitantly, there was a sharp decrease
in the archives (only ﬁve documents exist) for the department.45 The col-
lapse of the center as well as the expansion of provincial warlordism com-
pletely shattered the brokerage system established during the land reform
process.What Triggered Separatism
Like the warring states in early modern Europe, the domination of war-
lordism resembled a multipolar political system that increased insecurity
and the speed ofmilitarymobilization and resource extraction. The national
estimated growth of armies over this period is notable: in 1916 the army is
more than 500,000men, in 1918more than 1millionmen, in 1924more than
1.5 million men, and in 1928 more than 2 million men (Chi 1976, p. 78). By
summer 1925, Feng Yuxiang controlled over 100,000 capable soldiers.46 In
September 1925, Zhang Zuolin’s northeastern army amounted to 350,000
men, not including the Jehol and Shandong units, almost doubling the size
of the army before the 1924 war (McCormack 1977, p. 147). Even Yan
Xishan, the least aggressive warlord, recruited over 100,000 men after the
Zhili-Fengtian War (Gillin 1967, p. 109).
Intensive military competition generated the necessity for increased and
excessive economic extraction, a factor contributing substantially to regional
centralization. Yan Xishan was well known to be tightﬁsted. However, in
1928, the expenses of his provincial government were 350% greater than in
1925 and the annual deﬁcit roared from 685,571 yuan to 13,647,000 yuan,45See MZYD, Quanzongjuan 440, anjuanhao 22, 23, 24.
46Strictly speaking, this is just the number of the ﬁrst Citizenry Army directly com-
manded by Feng Yuxiang himself. The second and the third versions of the Citizenry
Army, led by Feng’s subordinates, were less well organized. The second army expanded
rapidly too, and by summer 1925 it numbered about 250,000 men. The third army
numbered over 30,000 men. For details, see Sheridan (1966, pp. 160–63).
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FIG. 4.—Inner Mongolian Governance Structure, 1917–1927
From Masterly Brokers to Compliant Protégéesdespite a sharp increase of taxation revenue (Gillin 1967, p. 110). To expand
income, some warlords increased taxation and relied on diverse foreign
loans (e.g., Zhang Zuolin depended on Japanese loans, whereas Feng Yu-
xiang relied on Soviet support). Some of them resorted to illegal means, ma-
nipulating currency value and proﬁting from opium cultivation.1673
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American Journal of Sociology
AlThe frontier suffered from this massive economic exploitation, as more
radical land cultivation projects were undertaken by the warlords’ regimes.
Feng Yuxiang, marshal of the Northwestern Defense, set up headquarters
in Chakhar in 1925. With the support of the frontier military governors,
he embarked upon a ﬁve-year plan to develop and populate this region
(Sheridan 1966, pp. 149–51). According to Desheng Wang (1987, p. 79), the
land values for those areas surveyed and opened between 1912 and 1928
skyrocketed. From 1912 to 1917, the land annually opened fewer than
1,500 qin. From 1917 to 1926, it exceeded 17,000 qin, reaching a peak in
1925–26, with 36,000 qin land opened. Then it slowed down, but still more
than 3,000 qin of land opened every year.
In the new rush for land cultivation, the frontier military governors, be-
ing completely compliant with the commands of their warlord patrons, no
longer played the role of brokers. On the contrary, they sided with the war-
lord regimes and aroused animosity from both Mongols and Han Chinese
migrants. For example, the ownership of the ofﬁcial grazing land and the
subsistence landof thehouseholdswithnodescendants ( juehudi)wasnever
clearly deﬁned in local tradition. Facing this ambiguity, Yigu ordered that
the rent collected from these lands should go to the banner government.47
However, the new rule implemented by Shang Zheng, a protégée of Yan
Xishan, in 1926 declared:
(Article Seven) Those lands having nonresident owners andwithout ten-
ants have been fallow for some time, which is a big loss to the govern-
ment. So the local governments [Han Chinese counties] should let peo-
ple know that these lands have been ofﬁcially conﬁscated. As long as the
land was fallow over 5 years, it should be conﬁscated, just like the sub-
sistence land of the households with no descendants.48
The new policy dictated that those lands with unclear ownership were
considered provincial, rather than theMongolian, property. Theywere con-
ﬁscated to maximize the warlords’ wealth. These actions contravened the
principle underlining the previous land reform, that is, insofar as the land
was located within Mongol banners, the Mongolian interest always took
priority.
Moreover, since the warlords no longer seriously considered Mongolian
rights in the opened land, they also attempted to reduce diversity in land
classiﬁcation and thus streamline the land policy. In 1927, the land recla-47See Can an diaocha ji, Suiyuan tongzhi guan (2007 [vol. 38], p. 270).
48Zhengdun huangzu chufen tiaoli ½Regulations about the rent of wild land, collected in
Suiyuan tongzhi guan (2007 [vol. 38], p. 369).
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From Masterly Brokers to Compliant Protégéesmation bureaus controlled by Suiyuan dutong announced that the privi-
leged land given by the Tümed Banners to the Manchu princess should
be elevated to taxable land just like the regular land. It claimed that “within
the same county, to adopt two methods, is not good for the polity.”49 Most
Mongol nobles were infuriated by these changes, and their antagonism
toward the Han Chinese warlords grew. This evidence reveals that the
frontier military governors in this period aligned completely with the Han
Chinese warlords, whose immediate concern was economic extraction, not
balancing the Mongol-Han relationship.
To the Han Chinese migrants, the warlords’ rule was equally oppres-
sive. Not interested in nourishing the Chinese settlers, the warlords and
their agents took money for irrigation and increased the taxation on most
peasants. A great number of desperate Chinese peasants ﬂed. The land they
purchased soon became fallow, and the rent they owed to the Mongols
was never paid. The departure of Han Chinese migrants gravely worsened
the situation of most Mongols, as most of the obligations originally re-
quested by local governments to theHanChinesemigrants now fell onto the
Mongols. The departure of Han Chinese peasants destroyed another pil-
lar of the frontier governance system. Mongols were now called upon to
pay taxes and provide labor for local infrastructural building.50 This left the
Mongols in direct confrontation with the Han Chinese warlords and their
protégées.
To brieﬂy summarize, the warlords’ regimes broke apart the frontier gov-
ernance system that had been carefully put together by frontier military
governors during the land reform. By completely subjugating frontier mil-
itary governors, the warlords’ rule damaged the intermediate linkage be-
tween the center and periphery, Han and Mongols. No longer discreetly
pursuing a middle path of balancing the interests of multiple parties, the
warlordsweremainly interested in strengthening their local kingdoms.These
efforts resulted in regional centralization. In this case, a similar trajectory
of minority separatism, like that of the Ottoman and Russian Empires, ap-
peared.
Witnessing the decay of the frontier brokerage system, the Mongols re-
alized a direct confrontation with the Han Chinese warlords’ regimes was
inevitable. Lacking intermediate forces to moderate the Mongol-Han op-
position, conﬂict became constant and brutal. Unlike one decade previ-
ously,Mongolswere no longer attracted by the prospect of unitingwithHan49 Ibid., p. 388.
50Minguo shinian zhi minguo ershinian kenwu gaikuang (General conditions of land
reclamation from 1921 to 1931), collected in Suiyuan tongzhi guan (2007 [vol. 38],
p. 359).
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AlChinese migrants under powerful brokers—the frontier military governors.
Instead, they sought alliances with other Mongols against the warlords. In
the archives, the ﬁrst Mongolian petition for establishing an interleague
association appeared in 1925, exactly at the same time that Feng Yuxiang
solidiﬁedhis control inSuiyuan.Thenobles of theUlaanchabandYekheJuu
leagues actively worked on a horizontal Mongolian association that could
protect Mongolian interests. Not wanting to incur the suspicions of sepa-
ratism, they used the rhetoric of “administrative convenience,” saying that
“the six banners of theUlaanchab league and the seven banners of theYekhe
Juu league were located at great distances from one another, which created
extra obstacles for local administration.” 51 These attempts to form a Mon-
golian association indicated that Mongol-Han ethnic division was ﬁrmly
entrenched.
A more far-ﬂung Mongolian separatist movement came into being dur-
ing the 1930s. Itwas organized by a prominentMongol noble from theShili-
yin Gool league, Prince De, in 1933 and attracted a great number of nobles
andMongolian intellectuals. Unlike most nationalist movements that high-
lighted the goal of establishing independent states (see, e.g., Breuilly 1982,
Anderson 1983, Tilly 1997), the Mongolian separatist movement speciﬁ-
cally sought to demarcate the boundaries betweenMongolian andHanChi-
nese territories in a swift response to the expansion of Han Chinese war-
lordism. This crisis of “Mongolian separatism” was exacerbated even more
by the spread of Japanese imperialism into north China.52DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In dialogue with a variety of literature on the center-periphery relationship
in empires, this article explains the belated emergence of Mongolian sepa-
ratism within the context of Chinese imperial dissolution. I focused on three
periods, each of which, according to the mainstream center-periphery per-
spective explanation, was characterized by a set of events that could have
spurred Mongolian separatism. The ﬁrst period was strongly inﬂuenced by
the deployment of land reform, which was in many aspects analogous to the
late imperial reforms adopted by the Ottoman and Russian Empires to
strengthen state capacity. Yet unlike the course of events in the other two51Petition sent by theUlaanchab andYekhe Juu leagues to theDepartment ofMongolian
and Tibetan Affairs regarding the foundation of the Ulaanchab–Yekhe Juu Association
(1925, no speciﬁc date). It is included in Dazongtong, Mengzangyuan dui ge mengqu
youguan difang zhidu zi chen cheng tiao deng gongwen de zhaofu ½The president’s and
the Department of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs’ responses to the Mongolian banners’
petitions about local institutions], MZYD, Quanzongjuan 440, anjuanhao 22.
52For Prince De’s leadership of this movement, see Jagchid (1999) and Atwood (2002).
For the relevant original sources, see Tan (1935).
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From Masterly Brokers to Compliant Protégéesempires, the land reform, though markedly diminishing the authority of the
Mongol banners, did not result in Mongolian separatism. My study shows
that, in this case, political centralization moved in tandem with the consol-
idation of an intermediate body—the frontier governance system—in which
the frontier military governors acted as powerful brokers who orchestrated
the smooth inner workings of this system. Political centralization did not de-
stroy, but rather was facilitated by, the growth of the hinges between center
and periphery, Han and Mongols. This layer of intermediate governance
largely diffused the pressure of centralization. Mongols were not victimized
in this process, so no separatism occurred.
The second period saw the eruption of revolution and the Qing Empire
replaced by the Republic of China. Political disorder and sinicization of fron-
tier institutions could have triggered Mongolian separatism. Even so, there
was still no separatist movement. My study shows that Mongol nobles and
Han Chinese migrant elites were not split by their ethnic differences. Instead
they were united by their common interest to in perpetuating the frontier
governance system led by the frontier military governors. This system again
buffered the Mongolian frontier from the repercussions of a series of dra-
matic events that could have encouraged Mongolian separatism.
The third period was characterized by the collapse of the central gov-
ernment and the advent of Han Chinese provincial warlordism. While mil-
itarily subjugating the frontier to the provincial bases, the warlords insti-
tuted their own protégées as frontier military governors. These practices
completely destroyed the intermediate body of governance. The hinges be-
tween center and periphery, Han and Mongols, vanished with the dissolu-
tion of the frontier governance system. Mongols were suddenly under the
direct, blatant exploitation of the warlords’ regimes, andMongol-Han con-
frontations also became acute. At this juncture, Mongolian separatism ﬁ-
nally emerged. This third period most coherently evinces the strength of
center-periphery explanations that assume political centralization will in-
stigate minority separatism, but at a regional rather than a national level.
The China–Inner Mongolia case therefore shows that speciﬁc events
alone, such as political centralization, state collapse, nationalization, and so
on, can hardly decide the timing and chances of minority separatism for
all empires. Instead, the causal effects of these events are more accurately
measured by taking into account the confounding mechanism of the struc-
tural transformations of the intermediate body of governance. In theChina–
Inner Mongolia case, the intermediate body of governance is multiethnic,
consisting of both central and local agents, thereby combining characteris-
tics of both direct and indirect rule. This structure challenges the center-
periphery explanation, which assumes a clear-cut dichotomy of direct and in-
direct rule. Moreover, the China–Inner Mongolia case shows that the causal
effects of the transition from indirect to direct rule onminority separatism are1677
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Almost conspicuous at a regional level, when the intermediate body of gover-
nance evaporated alongwith the collapse of the central government. In other
words, direct confrontation between the Mongols and Han Chinese regimes
occurred on a regional rather than anational scale. Basedupon theseﬁndings,
a center-periphery model can be constructed that will take into account the
structural determination of intermediate connections linking the center to the
periphery and how those connections mediate the effects of events that could
potentially split the empire.
Although this study does not explicitly deal with the question of Mon-
golian nationalism, it does shed important light on that point. Conceiving
of nationalism as a force driven by an aspiration toward cultural identity,
most previous studies emphasize the joint mobilizing efforts of Mongolian
intellectuals and politicians (Bulag 1998; Jagchid 1999). Some perceiveMon-
golian nationalism to be a contingent outcome of large-power contentions,
mainly between China and Russia (Liu 2004). These studies offer detailed
accounts of the Mongolian nationalist leadership groups, their ambiguous
participation in Chinese communist movements, and their strategic position
in the Sino-Russia geopolitical relationship. Yet these scholars fail to address
a long-term question: Beginning in the late 19th century, in what sense was
Mongolian nationalism correlated with the transformation of the Chinese
imperial system? This question leads us beyond a parochial interest in the
Chinese minority question and characterizes the China case as a companion
to the transition of the Ottoman and Russian Empires. Some scholars have
conducted this pioneering work (e.g., Esherick 2006), but their studies are
limited by the assumptions of center-periphery explanations. Failing to ad-
dress the belated timing ofMongolian separatism, they deem revolution and
the creation of a Chinese national republic to be decisive events that auto-
matically awakened the Mongolian national consciousness and propelled
Mongolian separatism.
In this article, I correct this false periodization. My study shows that the
decisive events triggering Mongolian nationalism were not speciﬁcally due
to external impingements on InnerMongolia. Rather, they were events that
resulted in structural transformations profoundly changing the positions of
theMongols andHan in the local political system, ultimately creating a con-
frontational relationship between the two groups. Instead of treating state
centralization as an exogenous event, or an “ever-present and ever-rising
force” (Sewell 2005, p. 90), my study reveals the local structural transforma-
tion that facilitates or constrains the unfolding and impact of state central-
ization. For that reason, the rise of ethnic confrontations in Inner Mongolia
is not presented as a variation of the “master process” demonstrating how
center impingements trigger peripheral separatism. Instead, this increase
in acrimony shows how the convergence or divergence of local transforma-1678
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From Masterly Brokers to Compliant Protégéestions with impingements from a central point affects the chances of periph-
eral separatism.53
Moreover, inspired by recent ethnic studies (Brubaker 2004; Wimmer
2008) that question the essential nature of ethnicity, my study conﬁrms that
ethnic identity is not a predetermined thing, waiting to be awakened. Nei-
ther is it a purely intellectual construct (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992). In-
stead, collective identity, as revealed in this series of events, is relationally
based (Gould 1995). This article tremendously beneﬁts from the local-
relational approach employed in macrosociological studies (Bearman 1993;
Gould 1995; Barkey andVanRossem 1997). Not conceiving ofmacroevents
as a transformative power that shape identity, my study is built upon the
insight that there are many ways in which people can view their relations
with each other (Gould 1995). It is a person’s position in these relations that
determines at which point which particular identity is prioritized. In both
the land reform and the interregnum period after the revolution, Mongols
gave priority to their identity as a member of the frontier governance sys-
tem, as did the Han Chinese migrants, despite their comprehensive dis-
similarity in language, customs, culture, and occupations.When the frontier
governance system that sustained this identity ruptured during the war-
lord period, Mongols found themselves in direct confrontation with intru-
sive Han Chinese regimes. This new position consolidated the notion that
Mongols shared nothing in common with Han Chinese and that they must
politically unite against the latter. Put another way, the frontier governance
system facilitated cross-cutting identities for both Mongols and Han Chi-
nese migrants. Mongols were nomads enrolled in a banner/league system,
engaged in a distinct pastoral mode of economic life. Han Chinese migrants
were sedentarypeasantsgovernedbyabureaucratic system.However, elites
from both groups were simultaneously and foremost members of the fron-
tier governance system.These cross-cutting identities dwindledwith the rise
of the Chinese warlords. The absence of cross-cutting collective identities
would lead one to expect very high levels of mobilization, as Gould (1995,
p. 17) argues. It is not surprising that Mongolian separatism erupted at
the juncture when the frontier governance system that sustained hybridized
identities for both Mongols and Han Chinese collapsed.
The dwindling of cross-cutting identities corresponds to the evaporation
of the frontier governance system as an intermediate body, in the aftermath
of which a polarized center-periphery structure emerged. The Chinese im-
perial structure is somewhat analogous to the three-layered structure of53My study tries to not commit the error as stated by Sewell (1996, p. 102) that “the
local variations are mere surface perturbations with no long-term effect on the course of
history.”
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Alworld-systems constructed by Immanuel Wallerstein (1974). The three-
layered structure encompasses the center, the periphery, and the semi-
periphery and characterizes both world empires and world economies,
whose stability speciﬁcally hinges on the functioning of the semiperiphery.
In many world empires, the semiperiphery was represented by a middle
stratum that participated in the “marginally desirable long-distance luxury
trade,” and whose economic activities considerably increased the cohesive-
ness of isolated clusters of local society (Wallerstein 1974, p. 405). The core
controlled the military machine that guaranteed its ability to redistribute
economic resources in the imperial realm. Careful manipulation of the mid-
dle stratum was key to the stability of the empire. On the one hand, the core
had to allow the middle stratum to garner some portion of trade beneﬁts so
that a potential leadership of local society was bought off by the center. On
the other hand, the core had to contain the growth of this stratum by fre-
quently resorting to conﬁscatory measures, lest the middle stratum over-
shadow the center. The semiperiphery zones in theworld economyplayedan
isomorphic role. Being both the exploited and the exploiter, the semiperiph-
ery largely diffused the tension between the center and the periphery, and
thus reduced the possibility of the center being faced with the united oppo-
sition of all others (Wallerstein 1974, p. 405).
The frontier governance system analyzed here has a structure akin to the
semiperiphery in the world-systems. As I have shown, the demolition of this
structure led to polarized confrontations between the newly formed regional
political centers and theMongolian frontier, theHanChinesewarlords, and
theMongol nobles. The polarization of the center-periphery relationship (in
the China case, on a regional scale) therefore is an important cause of mi-
nority separatism. This key mechanism however is entirely missing from
most center-periphery explanations, which presume an initial opposition
between the center and the periphery. This initial opposition was not ex-
pressly articulated when the center was kept at distance from the periph-
ery (through indirect rule) but became an overtly disruptive force when the
distance was shortened (the transition to direct rule). The center-periphery
explanations therefore fail to address an initial situation in which the center
is not inimical to the periphery, not exactly because of distance, but because
of the existence of another layer of relationship thatwelds the interests of the
center and the periphery. In other words, we need to explain rather than
assume the polarization of the center-periphery relationship.
Finally, this new focus on the polarization of center-periphery relation-
ship leads us to reﬂect upon the broader issue of imperial dissolution and
minority nationalism in other empires. It would be worthwhile to inquire
whether the semiperiphery, in the form of an intermediate body of gover-
nance that sustained cross-cutting identities, existed in either the Ottoman
Empire or the Russian Empire. If it did exist, how is its transformation re-1680
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From Masterly Brokers to Compliant Protégéeslated to minority nationalism in both countries? Scholars of the Ottoman
Empire have long been aware of the intersecting divisions of Ottoman so-
ciety. Among them, the best-known division was enforced along religious
lines, breaking the Ottoman imperial realm into four millets. Respectively,
these were the Orthodox Greek, Jewish, Armenian, and Muslim millets.54
However, themilletmainlywielded judicial andreligiousauthority,whereas
secular administrative authority was attributed to other units such as prov-
inces, cities, rural villages, and so on (see Shaw1976–77, pp. 150–51;Wimmer
2002, pp. 159–62). These intersecting divisions muddled the boundaries of
center and periphery in the Ottoman Empire. To what extent their compo-
nents were interwoven into an intermediate layer of governance that but-
tressed the construction of hybridized identities is an interesting question.
Answering it will certainly raise new questions about the causes of minority
separatism.
The Russian Empire could likewise be divided into intersecting parts.
AsEdwardWalker (2006) argues, Tsarist Russia never relied on “horizontal
fraternal feelings” of national belonging to bind the empire as a whole. It
was instead built upon the Orthodox principle (religiously) and the auto-
cratic power of the tsar (politically). The discrepancy between the Orthodox
and non-Christian religious believers, as well as the status distinction be-
tween the nobles and peasants, far exceeded ethnic differences in the Rus-
sian Empire.55 It is therefore inadequate to conceive of the Russian Empire
as constructed in accordance with a strictly deﬁned center-periphery model
that assumes the center and the periphery aremainly distinguished by ethnic
differences. If these differences were engendered by intersecting rather than
compartmentalized political institutions, an extra layer of political relation-
ship might have been generated that would nourish hybridized identities.
Whether and under what conditions these hybridized identities lost salience
and were replaced by a strong ethnic identity are also interesting questions
that would refresh our understanding of minority separatism and the Rus-
sian imperial dissolution.54The Orthodox Greek millet uniﬁed the Bulgarian, Serbian, and Greek patriarchates
under the patriarch of Constantinpole. The Jewish millet was led by the grand rabbi of
Istanbul and attracted Jewish emigrants from Western Europe, Spain, Portugal, Ger-
many, and Central Europe. The Armenian millet ruled subjects not belonging to other
religious groups, e.g., Gypsies, the Assyrians, the Monophysites of Syria and Egypt, the
Bogomils of Bosnia, etc. The Muslim millet governed most Muslim populations and
greatly expanded after the conquest of the Arabs. See Shaw (1976–77, pp. 151–52).
55Walker (2006) argues that only European colonial empires emphasized ethnic dis-
tinctions. Slezkine (1994) similarly argues that the superiority of Russians over the Mol-
davians was felt to be related to education, rather than ethnicity. However, since the
1990s scholars have tended to spread the notion that the Russian empire was a multi-
national empire. For example, Francine Hirsh (2005) illustrates the continuous pro-
duction of ethnographical knowledge and using that to frame multinational policy, a
practice persisting from imperial Russia to the Soviet Union.
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AlAPPENDIXTABLE A1
Administrative Experiences of the Frontier Military Ofﬁcials, 1900–1916NameYon
Xin
Yigu
Kun
Xili
Ting
Kuis
Son
Zha
Pan
Jian
He Z
Zha
Tian
Xion
This conten
l use subject to UniversiExperiencesgde . . . . . . . . . Chakhar dutong (1880), U-li-ya-su-tai jiangjun in Outer Mongolia
(1901), later committed suicide.ke . . . . . . . . . . Miyun deputy dutong around Beijing (1898), Jiangning jiangjun in
Jiangsu (1900).. . . . . . . . . . . Attended the Hanlin yuan (Imperial Academy) after getting the
degree, later worked for Ronglu and acted as vice minister before
being dispatched to Suiyuan.xiu . . . . . . . . . Vice minister of the Court of Dependencies (1906), ofﬁcial visit to
Germany, U-li-ya-su-tai jiangjun (1908).ang . . . . . . . . . Pingyang prefect in Shanxi (1893), Yizhou prefect in Shandong (1895),
provincial surveillance commissioner in Shanxi (1898), provincial
administrative commissioner in Hunan (1899), governor of Shanxi
(1900), governor of Henan (1901), Sichuan governor-general (1903),
governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou (1907), governor-general
of the three northeastern provinces (1909)jie . . . . . . . . . Chengde prefect in Zhili (1876), circuit intendant in Hunan (1890),
Fengtian prefect (1897), provincial administrative commissioner in
Zhili (1898), Shengjing jiangjun (1905).hun . . . . . . . . Xining banshi dacheng (1891), U-li-ya-su-tai jiangjun (1904).
gshou . . . . . . . Henan governor (1900), minister of works (1902), vice minister of war
(1905), later also Fujian governor.
ng Shaozeng . . . Staff ofﬁcer for Zhang Huaizhi (1903), artillery regiment commander
of the 2d Division, director of the training ofﬁce in Zhili and director
of the Imperial Military School before the revolution, commander of
the 20th Division in northeast (1911), Shanxi governor (1912).Juying . . . . . . Regiment commander in the 20th Division in Zhili (1907), commander
of the 20th Division (1911).g Yanxing . . . . Brigade commander of the 13th Brigade in Jiangsu before 1911 and
after that the Jiangsu governor, military commissioner of Jiangbei
stationed in Jiangsu (1913).onglian . . . . . Director of the Beiyang No. 1 Training Ofﬁce (1904), battalion ofﬁcer
in the 1st Brigade in Gansu (1906), commander of the 1st Division
stationed in Gansu, deputy Chakhar dutong (1907).ng Huaizhi . . . Commander of the 5th Division stationed in Shandong (1909),
provincial military commander in Gansu (1911), regional com-
mander in Tianjin (1911), commander of the Patrol Defense Corps
in Shandong (1912), governor in Anhui (1912).Zhongyu . . . . Brigade commander of 4th Brigade in the 2d Division stationed in
Zhili (1904), brigade commander of the Mixed Brigade of New
Army in Guangdong (1906), major advisor in the Training Ofﬁce of
the three northeastern provinces (1907), brigade commander of the
23d Mixed Brigade of the New Army in Jiangsu (1910), regional
commander in Yanzhou in Shandong (1911), commander of
Military Defense Army in Shandong (1912), vice minister of war in
Beijing (1915), military governor in Jilin (1916).g Xiling . . . . . Studied in Japan (1900), teaching in Changde Normal School (1903),
accompanying ﬁve ministers studying constitution abroad (1905),
director of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce in Fengtian
(1906), commissioner of salt transportation in Fengtian (1910),
ﬁnancial secretary in Jiangsu (1911), minister of ﬁnance (1912).1682
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Jian
Che
Cai
Ma
Li M
Liu
Jian
Song
Shan
This con
All use subject to UniveExperiencesg Guiti . . . . . . Joined Seng-ge-lin-qin’s army to suppress the Nian rebellion in north
China (1865) and later joined Zuo Zongtang to suppress the Muslim
rebellion in Gansu, brigade commander in Yunan and joined Song
Qin’s Yi Army (1894), regiment commander in Yuan Shikai’s New
Army (1896), provincial military commander (1900), chief commander
of the wuwei youjun stationed in Beijing (1901), Zhili military
commander and the chief commander of wuwei zuojun (1908).NOTE.—The sources of data are Manzu da cidian (Manchu Dictionary; Sun et al. 1990),
Biographies Related to the Qing History (Guoshiguan and Zhonghua shu ju 1928), and
Dictionary of People during the Republic of China (Xu 2007).
TABLE A2
Administrative Experiences of the Frontier Military Ofﬁcials, 1917–28Namet
rAdministrative Experienceg Yanxing . . . . . Commander of the 13th Brigade stationed in Jiangsu before 1911,
commissioner of military defense in north Jiangsu (1913).n Guangyuan . . . Commander of the 7th Brigade of the 4th Division stationed in
Tianjin (1910), commander of the 4th Division in Tianjin (1911),
private consultant for Yuan Shikai in Beijing (1912), commander
of Military Patrol Corps in Jehol (1913).Chengxun . . . . . Deputy commander of the army stationed in Beijing (1900), brigade
commander in the 21st Division stationed in Zhejiang (1911),
commander of the military guards for Yuan Shikai (1912), com-
mander of the 1st Brigade of the 1st Division (1913), commander of
the 1st Division (1914), commander of the 7th Army corps (1917).Fuxiang . . . . . . Joined the Gansu army led by Dong Fuxiang (1898), Altai military
commissioner (1904), brigade commander of Gansu and Ningxia
(1912).ingzhong . . . . . Regiment commander (1917), brigade commander (1921), brigade
commander of the 21st Brigade of the 11th Division stationed in
Henan (1922), commander of the 8th Mixed Brigade (1924),
commander of the 6th Division of the 1st Army Corps led by Feng
Yuxiang (1924).Yufen . . . . . . . . Platoon ofﬁcer in the 19th Division stationed in Yunnan before the
revolution, teaching in military school of Beijing (1912), teaching
ofﬁcer in the 16th mixed brigade of Feng Yuxiang’s army (1912),
chief of staff of the 16th Mixed Brigade (1914), commander of the
20th Brigade (after second Zhili-Fengtian War), Gansu military
governor under Feng’s leadership (1924).g Hongyu . . . . . Teaching ofﬁcer and staff ofﬁcer of the 26th Mixed Brigade in Feng
Yuxiang’s army, commander of the 12th Division (1925).Zheyuan . . . . . Attended Feng Yuxiang’s battalion in Lu Jianzhang’s army (1912),
deputy commander of the 1st Battalion of the 16th Mixed Brigade
(1914), commander of the 1st Battalion (1917), commander of the
25thMixed Brigade (1922), commander of the 11thDivision (1924).g Zhen . . . . . . Joined the new army in northeast before the revolution, dispatched
to Shaanxi with Shaanxi governor Lu Jianzhang and acted as
battalion commander (after 1912), commander of the 1st Regiment
in Shaanxi (1915), commander of the 4thMixedRegiment in Shanxi1683
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(1915) and joined Yan Xishan’s army, commander of the 1st
Division in south Shanxi (1924).tai . . . . . . . . . . Active revolutionary member in Suiyuan, commander of the 1st
Brigade of the Suiyuan calvary (1926).Xipeng . . . . . . Platoon commander in the 27th division in northeast before he went
to Japan in 1923, commander of the 2d Regiment of the 8th
Calvary Brigade in northeast (1925), Commander of the 8th
Calvary Brigade (1926), commander of the 16th Division (1927).nchun . . . . . . . . Bandit in his early years and after being paciﬁed joined the Fengtian
army, commander of the 56th Brigade of the 28th Division (1913),
commander of the 28th Division (1917), Jehol dutong (1921),
deputy commander of the 4th Army Corps and the commander of
the 9th Division in Fengtian army (1924).ng Jingyao . . . . Joined Yuan Shikai’s New Army (1896), battalion commander of the
6th Division, commander of the 3d Mixed Regiment (1914),
participated the war in Sichuan and worked for the military
defense in Sichuan (1916), commander of bandit-exterminating
force in four provinces (Jiangsu, Anhui, Shandong, and Henan)
under Duan Qirui’s leadership (1917).g Tingzhen . . . . Regiment ofﬁcer in Qing army (1903), commander of Imperial
Military Guards (1909), commissioner of military defense in
Tianjin (1913), commissioner of military defense in Jiangsu (1914),
inspector general of Jiangsu (1917).ng Jinhui . . . . . . Battalion commander in the Patrol Defense Corps of Fengtian led
by Zhang Zuolin before the revolution, various military positions
in Fengtian army until promoted to the commander of the 1st
Division (1912–1918), commander of the 16th Division (1920).ng Xiyuan . . . . . Commander of the 58th Regiment of the 29th Mixed Brigade in
Henan (1911), commander of the 1st Division in Henan (1912),
commander of the 9th Division (1914), commander of the 2d
Regiment in Beijing (1916), attended war in Shaanxi (1918) and
the commissioner of military defense in Shaanxi (1921), later
joined Feng Yuxiang’s army.ng Zhijiang . . . . Joined the Tianjin army (1903), platoon commander of the 1st Mixed
Brigade in Fengtian (1907), organized the Study Group of Martial
Arts with Feng Yuxiang (1910), secondary staff ofﬁcer of the
Eastern Route of North Shanxi army (1912), staff ofﬁcer of the
16th Mixed Brigade led by Feng Yuxiang (1914), regiment
commander of the 16th Mixed Brigade (1918), commander of the
22d Brigade of the 11th Division in Shaanxi.honglin . . . . . . Joined the 6th Division in Beijing (1907), ofﬁcial in the 79th Regiment
of the 40th Brigade (1910), joined the northern revolutionary army
but failed (1912),various positions in the 16thMixed Brigade led by
Feng Yuxiang (1916–21), chief of the Department of Police in
Henan (1922), garrison commander in Beijing (1924).Weiyue . . . . . . Chief of staff in the 27th Division (1912), commander of the 53d
Brigade (1921), commander of the 7th Division of the Northeastern
army (1925), commander of the 9th Corps Army of Anguojun led
by Zhang Zuolin (1926).o Daiwen . . . . . President of Shanxi University (1900). Joined Yan Xishan and
appointed as the chief of the Department of Secretary in Shanxi
provincial government (1912), chief of staff in Shanxi provincial
army (1916), commander of the 4th Mixed Brigade (1917), joined
the Nationalist party and led the Shanxi party branch (1926).downloaded from 147.008.230.123 on August 23, 2016 19:30:56 PM
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This cont
All use subject to UniverAdministrative Experienceg Guiti . . . . . . . Joined Seng-ge-lin-qin’s army to suppress the Nian rebellion in
north China (1865) and later joined Zuo Zongtang to suppress the
Muslim rebellion in Gansu. Brigade commander in Yunan and
joined Song Qin’s Yi Army (1894). Regiment commander in Yuan
Shikai’s New Army (1896), Gansu provincial commander (1900),
chief commander of the wuwei youjun stationed in Beijing (1901),
Zhili commander and the chief commander ofwuwei zuojun (1908).g Huiqing . . . . Joined Nie Shicheng’s Huai army in Shanxi (1892), appointed by
Yuan as the regiment commander and later the commander of the
2d Brigade in Beiyang calvary (1905), accompanied Xu Shichang
to Northeast and acted as the director of the military affairs of
Three Northeastern Provincies (1907), military governor of
Luanzhou and brigade commander of Tianjin and commissioner
of military defense in Duolun (1912), commissioner of military
defense in southern Shanxi (1914), assistant in military affairs in
Zhili (1918), commander of the 13th Division (1919), in charge of
the paciﬁcation in Beijing during the Zhili-Anhui war (1920).henbiao . . . . . . Joined Li Hongzhang’s Huai army and later took various positions
in Song Qing’s Yi army, assistant in miltiary affairs of Jehol (1913),
vice dutong in Jehol while Jiang Guiti was the dutong (1921).Chaoxi . . . . . . Joined Zhang Zuolin’s army (1906), staff ofﬁcer of the 27th Division,
commander of the 27th Artillery Regiment of the 27th Division
(1917), commander of the 2d Mixed Brigade in Fengtian army
(1918), Commissioner ofmilitary defense in Jilin and commander of
the 2d Mixed Brigade (1919), commander of the 3d Division of the
northeastern army during the second Zhili-FengtianWar (1924).g Yuling . . . . . . Commander of the Patrol Defense Battalion in Fengtian before the
revolution, commander of the 27th Regiment and the 53d Brigade
in the Calvary of the 27th Division (1912), helped Zhang Xun’s
restoration and ﬂed to Outer Mongolia after his defeat, military
consultant for Zhang Zuolin (1919), commander of the 11th Mixed
Brigade (1920), chief commander of the 12 Corps Army under
Zhang Zuolin (1926).NOTE.—The source of these data is the Dictionary of People during the Republic of China
(Xu 2007).REFERENCES
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